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Traditionally, the idea of violence evokes the use of brutal force 
against one or many individuals. Often, however, brutal conduct 
originates far from the actual site of violence. Domestic and sexual 
violence, violence among and against youth, and violence upon 
oneself are usually consequences of other factors. Scholars refer to 
these indirect factors as structural violence. They examine the effects 
of institutional bureaucracies and normative institutions that sustain 
the systematic denial of rights to citizens.2 Historical records indicate 
that structural violence is an effective form of long-term population 
oppression by means of laws and societal norms. Structural violence 
supports privileged positions among the elite, who use it to prioritize 
their own political agendas and sustaining ideologies. Its effects are 
manifested in disparities in political opportunities and social standing. 
1. I am very grateful to Elsa Stamatopoulou for encouraging me to focus on this 
subject matter by providing an opportunity to share the findings from my research 
with Columbia University students and the Columbia University community, and 
for inviting me to contribute to this publication. I am also thankful to my great 
colleagues Dan Haley and Pamela Grieman for their help in editing this work. 
Finally, I would like to thank the UCLA American Indian Studies Center for 
supporting my research. 
2. The following studies informed a conception of structural violence used in this 
work: for studies of violent conduct from the point of resource mobilization, see 
D. Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of 
Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise (New York: Routledge, 2008), 25–7; 
for an investigation of the connections between emotions and political violence, 
see R. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment 
in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 17–40; for studies of cultural violence, see P. Bourdieu 
and L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 167–74. A helpful typology of forms of political violence 
that informed this study was created by Donatella Della Porta: Donatella Della 
Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative analysis 
of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4.
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Legitimized by public policy and legislation, structural violence 
supports cultural beliefs and legitimizes myths fostering inequality. 
It creates hostile attitudes among authorities and citizenry toward 
its victims, who in response may turn to violent resistance. The 
consequences of structural violence are no less destructive than those 
caused by direct use of brutal force. 
Structural violence remains a fundamental property of the Russian 
state. It stems from the separation of state functions from the aspirations, 
needs and hopes of its citizens. The degree to which structural violence 
affects Russian citizens depends on a variety of factors, and varies 
greatly within different subgroups. Indigenous communities are among 
the most vulnerable and affected targets of this kind of violence. They 
are part of political, economic and legal systems that are not of their 
own making. Indigenous views and perceptions of rights, freedoms 
and justice historically have not served as the basis for the laws and 
resulting policies to which most Indigenous communities have been 
subject since the Soviet era. The federal government remains the 
main voice in deciding which rights and privileges are accorded to 
Indigenous Peoples. As a result, Russian-born Indigenous persons are 
subjected to violence from the day they are born. 
This work emphasizes that structural violence toward Indigenous 
Peoples, as enacted through the workings of contemporary institutions 
of governance of the Russian state, recreates the oppression 
characteristic of the Soviet era. This study reveals continuity between 
Soviet treatment and political opportunities of the “small Peoples of the 
North,” as the official terminology goes—the original 26 communities 
who would gain Indigenous status with the establishment of the Russian 
state—and the legal and political institutions defining indigeneity in 
contemporary Russia. Further, it argues that the question of Indigenous 
rights stemmed from and remains a part of nationality policies, a state-
wide set of measures focused on the political rights of the non-Russian 
groups within the multicultural federal system of Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia. These policies institutionalized the notion of inferiority 
of (now Indigenous) communities as dependent on the guidance and 
financial assistance of the state. The notion of inferiority shaped the 
consciousness of Soviet and post-Soviet authorities who continue to 
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administer these Indigenous communities as populations dependent 
upon the state. And yet, the opportunities to participate in the state 
system of administration since the Soviet times shaped Indigenous 
politics in post-Soviet Russia; and the fact that Indigenous activists 
are able to envision their communities as “Indigenous Peoples,” or 
communities with a right to self-determined existence, signifies a step 
forward, despite increased oppression against non-Russian minorities 
today in response to the current use of nationality policies as a means 
toward centralization of the state. 
This essay develops these claims in three interrelated essays, aimed 
at disseminating findings from Russian and western scholarship, and 
at stimulating more research in the areas examined. The first essay, 
“Legal and Institutional Framework Concerning Indigenous Rights,” 
reviews legal developments in the area of Indigenous rights and 
draws primarily from legal scholarship. The second essay, “Means 
of Resistance to Structural Violence: Indigenous Politics,” theorizes 
means of Indigenous advocacy, drawing upon studies of Soviet and 
post-Soviet political institutions supporting rights of Indigenous 
and other cultural minorities. It also investigates the history of post-
Soviet Indigenous mobilizations. The final essay, “Consequences 
of Structural Violence,” examines the effects of structural violence 
and draws from the studies of Indigenous demographics and socio-
economic conditions of Indigenous populations, and the recent 
2010 census data. The essay advocates for the widening of political 
opportunities for Indigenous Peoples at the regional and local levels 
of the contemporary Russian state. 
Use of terms and structure of this essay
There is no formal definition of the term “Indigenous Peoples” in 
international law and the prevailing view today is that no formal universal 
definition of the term is necessary. According to the fundamental right 
to self-determination contained in the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and other human rights instruments, 
Indigenous status is through self-identification. Article 9 of UNDRIP 
stipulates that Indigenous Peoples and individuals have the right to 
195STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
belong to an Indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the 
traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned.
The Soviet state did not ratify the International Labour Organization 
(herein ILO) Convention 107 (1957), arguing that it was relevant only 
to the post-colonial states’ settings. Furthermore, during Soviet times, 
the question of Indigenous rights was a “taboo.” The Russian state did 
not ratify the Convention either, and abstained from the vote during the 
adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in 2007. At the same time, based on the right to self-determination and 
self-identification enshrined in UNDRIP, it is possible for Indigenous 
communities to claim Indigenous status, even in cases when the 
government of the state where these communities are located does 
not recognize the relevant international instruments, as is the case in 
contemporary Russia. The underlying logic behind the application of 
the term “Indigenous” in this essay emerges from that very assumption: 
the term signifies communities that might claim the rights recognized 
in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including 
the right to autonomy. Further, the term specifically refers to groups 
classified as korennie malochilennie narodi by the Russian legislation.
Indigenous issues are part of larger policies in the Russian context, 
which focus on the relationship between the federal government and 
its subjects, and are termed nationality policies. Nationality policies in 
Russia consist of the set of norms and measures that have historically 
focused on the rights and privileges of non-Russian communities 
composing the Soviet and now the Russian federal state. Nationality 
(in Russian, natsional’nost’), which was part of the Soviet legal 
vocabulary, currently captures the formally (i.e., by the state) accepted 
cultural identity of a group or of a citizen. Such is the meaning of the 
term “nationality” within the context of this essay. 
The difference between a “nationality” and a “nation” (people) within 
the Soviet and Russian contexts lies primarily in the political might of 
a group. A “nation” (Soviet nation) is a group with a right to govern 
its affairs in accordance with its cultural and historical specificities. 
Since the establishment of the Soviet Union, the characterization as 
“nation” would be assigned to groups who resided in a territory and 
were elevated to the status of “federal subject” (in Russian, sub’ekt). 
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The hierarchical structure of the Soviet Union remains in the Russian 
federal state. Non-Russian communities with larger demographics 
enjoy a greater degree of autonomy, with the republics being at the 
top of the hierarchy, while groups with smaller numbers fall within the 
administrative rule of the larger subjects (okrug, oblast, rayon). The 
okrugs are the only territories whose status as subjects originated in the 
recognition of these territories as historical homelands of communities 
currently recognized to have Indigenous status. The okrugs are among 
the most vulnerable entities in the asymmetrical arrangement of the 
Russian Federation, and are subordinate to a larger “host” unit to 
which they belong, administratively, as constituents. Republics, on the 
other hand, are defined by the Russian Constitution as states within a 
state, as they have the right to grant citizenship and institute their own 
language as the official language of the territory. 
Today, the number of “nationalities” composing the Russian state 
is different from the number of “subjects” of the federation: the total 
number of “nationalities” registered in the last (2010) census was 193, 
while the number of “subjects” was 83. Only a little over one third 
of the “subjects” are recognized as such because of the nationality of 
the group living in the territory of the “subject,” namely 22 republics 
and four autonomous okrugs. The meaning of the terms “subject” and 
“nationality” within the context of this essay derives from this note.
I. Legal and Institutional Framework  
Concerning Indigenous Rights
This essay investigates the origins of structural violence affecting 
Indigenous communities of contemporary Russia. It argues that the 
treatment of Indigenous rights in contemporary Russia remains, at 
the core, similar to the Soviet approach to the rights of the groups 
currently recognized to have Indigenous status. It develops this 
argument by establishing the genealogical lineage between the Soviet 
idea of indigeneity, which originated in early nationality policies, and 
the current treatment of Indigenous communities as dependent on state 
aid and political guidance. It illustrates how contemporary Russian 
laws grant communities with Indigenous status benefits and political 
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privileges unavailable to other nationalities. At the same time, it 
emphasizes that Indigenous individuals cannot realize their fundamental 
right to self-determination. Wide geographical distribution and small 
demographics of Indigenous communities further contribute to the 
structural inequality they experience. The lacking means of realization 
of Indigenous rights in Russia is a feature of the overall system of 
governance, where the means of administration of the state were not 
designed to accommodate the political rights of cultural minorities.
a) Indigeneity in the Russian Context
Russian laws recognize only an extremely small fraction of the 
state’s multi-ethnic population as deserving of the status of Indigenous 
Peoples. The legal term that signifies this status is korennie malochilennie 
narodi (herein KMN) or “native small-numbered Peoples.” The term 
emphasizes the ruling that only groups consisting of 50,000 persons or 
less are eligible for state aid and privileges guaranteed to groups with 
Indigenous status. This limitation primarily serves to prevent other 
ethnic groups from benefitting from the government-given privileges 
and political rights associated with the status.3 In addition to this 
quantitative criterion, geographical limitations are applied to determine 
a group’s eligibility for the designated status. Only communities whose 
historical homeland is registered in the regions of the Russian North, 
Siberia, and Far East are entitled to the full benefits associated with 
Indigenous status.4 As a result, Indigenous communities constitute a 
very small portion of the state population. In 2010, the Indigenous 
communities accounted for about 250,000 persons, comprising less 
than 1% of close to 143 million of the total population of the state at 
3. Brian Donahoe, Joachim Otto Habeck, Agnieszka Halemba, and István Sántha, “Size 
and Place in the Construction of Indigeneity in the Russian Federation,” Current 
Anthropology 49, no. 6 (2008): 994.
4. The Russian legislature defines the geographical bounds by listing the territories 
belonging to the North in the legal instruments protecting Indigenous rights, as is 
particularly visible in the Law of the Russian Federation “On State Guarantees and 
Compensations for Persons Working and Residing in the Regions of the Far North 
and Territories Equivalent to the Far North” (0 Gosudarstvennykh Garantiyakh i 
Kompensatsiyakh Dlia Tekh Rabotayuszikh i Prozhivayuzcikh v Raionakh Krainego 
Severa i Priravnennykh k Nim Mestnostyam), No. 4520–1, 19.02.1993. 
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the moment of the latest census data collection.5 The groups, eligible 
for the full benefits associated with the status, constitute 40 distinct 
communities. An additional seven groups are recognized as Indigenous 
(i.e., they are classified as KMN), yet lack some key rights, since they 
are located in regions other than the North, Siberia, and the Far East.6 
The Russian criterion of indigeneity and the very term korennie 
originated during the early Soviet era. The current number of 40 distinct 
Peoples stemmed from the original listing of 26 Peoples, termed 
malie narodi Severa and commonly translated as “small Peoples of 
the North,”7 which was a term created during the late 1920s when the 
Soviet Union was established.8 The category “small Peoples of the 
North” became the instrument to calculate the demographics of the 
Northern communities, beginning with the first Special Polar Census 
of 1926–27, which registered all reindeer herders and hunters living 
in the North. From 1926 to 1993, the number of these communities 
accounted for the original 26 groups; after 1993, it was extended to 
include 40 current communities under the new status of the “native 
small-numbered people” with new political privileges. 
5. See Table 1 of this work. 
6. All communities are listed in the Act No. 255 of 2000 “On the Common List of 
Numerically Small Indigenous Peoples of Russia.” The seven groups with the status 
of KMN that are registered on this list but live primarily in other areas are the Abazin 
(North Caucasus), the Nağaybäk (Chelyabinsk oblast), the Bessermian (Udmurtia), 
the Vod’, the Komi-Izjorts (primarily Leningrad oblast), the Seto (Pskov oblast), and 
the Shapsugs (Krasnodarskiy kray). See Table 1 for the listing of these Peoples and 
a historical account of their demographics, from 1926 until 2010. 
7. Scholars tend to use the term “small Peoples of the North,” hence the use of 
the established term in this work. At the same time, a more precise translation 
of malie would be “minor”; the term in part was designed to capture an inferior 
(in comparison to demographically larger groups) positioning of Indigenous 
communities within an overall Soviet hierarchy of nations. 
8. This number changed with each census: for 1939 it was 62 (with 101 categories 
unpublished in census data); for 1959 it was 109; for 1970 it was 122; for 
1979 it was 125; for 1989 (last Soviet census) it was 128. See S. Sokolovskiy, 
“Indigeneity Construction in the Russian Census 2002.” Sibirica 6, no.1 (2007): 
Addendum; and also Table 1 of this work. The 2002 census accounted for 182 
categories (142 groups and 40 sub-groups); while the 2010 census had 193 (145 
groups and 48 sub-groups), or nested within groups recognized as separate, see 
Federal State Statistical Service, “Metodologicheskie Poyasnenia,” [Russian: 
Методологические Пояснения] (2010), http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/
perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/metod4.pdf
199STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The numerical limitation of 50,000 or less people also originated 
with the small demographics of the first 26 groups. During Soviet 
times, the demographics served as what was then perceived to be 
evidence of these groups’ eventual extinction. While this perception 
of Indigenous demographics justified the need for state aid to these 
communities, it also institutionalized the “small number” characteristic 
of indigeneity into these groups’ ascribed identity. Hence, there came 
into being the descriptor of “malie” (in different contexts translated as 
“minor” or “small”) in the original “small Peoples of the North,” and 
“small-numbered” in the current designation, signifying indigeneity. 
Sergei Sokolovskiy observes that the numerical criterion was adapted 
in part for practical purposes: it helped contemporary policy makers 
to justify their decisions on assigning the status to some communities 
while denying it to others.9 
Finally, the descriptor korennie originated in early Soviet nationality 
policies, particularly those classified as korenisatsiia (from the Russian 
noun koren’ or “root”). The engineers of the Soviet Union envisioned 
the state as a federal system of governance based upon a principle of 
self-determination of all nations. The nationality policies addressed the 
question of ensuring the rights of non-Russian groups to self-govern 
the lands considered and, often in the past, existing as their historical 
homes. Korenisatsiia provided political opportunities for non-Russian 
leaders to participate in the state administration of their communities, 
thus establishing the foundation for the development of an Indigenous 
elite in the Soviet political system.10 A significant part of these policies 
also targeted social living. Ethnic languages and cultural practices 
were promoted for the non-Russian groups that joined the Union. In 
the Soviet republics, the native language of a group became the official 
language of the territory. The state sponsored the development of native-
language education and presses; these linguistic policies helped to 
9. Sokolovskiy, supra note 8, at 76–77.
10. See part II of this work for a discussion of the set of policies targeting the 
development of political rights. For a detailed examination of korenisatsiia, see 
T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). A cultural element of 
these policies was abolished during the late 1930s; yet some projects were resumed 
during the later Soviet years.
200 Ulia Gosart
create written languages for oral-culture communities, including some 
Northern groups. The “small Peoples of the North” considered to be at 
an economic disadvantage also received state aid in support of bringing 
“socialist development” to ease their integration into the Union.11 
The contemporary Russian legal conception of indigeneity thus 
originated in Soviet assumptions about the Northern communities 
as vulnerable populations and inferior nationalities in comparison 
with demographically larger groups constituting the Soviet Union. 
Despite the changes in the regime of governance, this notion persisted, 
informing the contemporary approach to Indigenous issues in Russia, 
as the following sections demonstrate. Russian authorities continue 
to deny Indigenous Peoples the right to self-determine their political 
and economic affairs, forcing these groups to depend on state aid and 
guidance in their social and political affairs. 
b)  Overview of the History of Indigenous Rights 
Legislation12
The current laws supporting the rights of Indigenous communities 
in Russia are a product of complex and ongoing events. The history 
of these developments is complex given the amount of changes, some 
unexpected and some ongoing, which continue to affect implementation 
of the main principles protecting Indigenous rights in Russia. This 
history began in the late 1980s- early 1990s as a part of the larger 
11. S. Sokolovskiy, “Russian Legal Concepts and the Demography of Indigenous 
Peoples,” in Indigenous Peoples and Demography: The Complex Relation between 
Identity and Statistics, eds. P. Axelsson and P. Sköld, (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 
242.
12. This part briefly examines this question in response to the overall focus of this 
work. An extensive literature on the subject matter exists: see A. Stammler-
Gossmann, “Who is Indigenous? Construction of 'Indigenousness' in Russian 
Legislation.” International Community Law Review 11, no. 1 (2009): 69–102; I. 
Stoyanova, Theorizing the Origins and Advancement of Indigenous Activism: The 
Case of the Russian North, Dissertation Thesis (2009): 156–205. For the analysis 
of the Russian scholars, see V. Kryazhkov, “Development of Russian Legislation 
on Northern Indigenous Peoples.” Arctic Review 4, no. 2 (2013): 140–159; and 
Y. Yakel, “Obschaya Kharakteristika Deistvuyschego Zakonodatel’sta. Problemi 
Praktiki Primenenia,” [Russian: Общая Характеристика Действующего 
Законодательства. Проблемы Практики Применения in Sever i Severiane 
[Russian: Север и Северяне] eds. N. Novikova and D. Funk, (2012), 8–21. 
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project of constructing the institutions of democratic governance. In 
the area of nationality policies, that moment may be characterized 
by the notorious phrase of the first Russian President, Boris Yelt’sin 
(1991–1999), who, in 1992, offered to the leaders of the subjects of the 
transitioning Russian state to “take as much sovereignty as they could 
swallow.”13 President Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yelt’sin in 2000, 
reversed the federal approach to the nationality policies. In many ways 
reactionary, Putin’s focus remains on stabilizing and strengthening the 
power of central authorities. As a result, the post-Soviet development 
of Indigenous legislature can be characterized as exhibiting “extreme” 
oscillation between decentralization and centralization depending on 
the degree of political power of the central government.14 
1990s-Early 2000s
Regulations in the area of Indigenous rights fall within three 
general categories: the federal acts defining the political rights and 
privileges of Indigenous communities; regional acts corresponding to 
federal regulations in the same area, given that Indigenous issues are 
administered by the joint federal-regional powers; and laws dealing 
with the management of and access to natural resources that exist on 
federal and regional levels. The federal acts regulating Indigenous 
affairs are based on two Articles of the Constitution: Article 69 
recognizes the international legal principles and norms of protecting 
Indigenous rights; and Article 72(1.1) places the responsibility for 
protecting the traditional lifestyles of Indigenous communities and 
their traditional environments on state institutions. In addition, and 
in respect to international law in general, Article 15(4) provides for 
the recognition and application of international norms, treaties, and 
agreements as a component of the state legal system.15 The major 
13. S. Erlanger, “Tatar Area in Russia Votes on Sovereignty Today,” New York Times, 
March 21, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/21/world/tatar-area-in-russia-
votes-on-sovereignty-today.html. 
14. B. Krug and A. Libman, “Commitment to Local Autonomy in Non-Democracies: 
Russia and China Compared” Constitutional Political Economy 26, no. 2 (2015): 228.
15. Prior to the enactment of the Constitution in 1993, the 1991 tentative decree assigned 
KMN exclusive rights for the use of natural resources located in the territories of 
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federal acts defining Indigenous rights include three framework laws. 
The first federal law N 82-FZ, passed on April 30, 1999, is termed “On 
the Guarantees of the Rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples 
of Russian Federation” (in Russian, O Garantiah Prav Korennikh 
Malochislennikh Narodov Rossiyskoy Federatsii). It defines the main 
rights of Indigenous communities. Two other framework laws, passed 
in subsequent years, including: the federal law N 104-FZ “On the 
General Principles of Organization of Small-Numbered Indigenous 
Peoples of North, Siberia and Far East of Russian Federation” passed 
on July 20, 2000 (in Russian, Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organisatsii 
Obshchin Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov Severa, Sibiri i 
Dalnego Vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii); and the federal law N 49-FZ 
“On the Territories of Traditional Nature Use of Small-Numbered 
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of Russian 
Federation” passed on May 7, 2001 (in Russian, O Territoriakh 
Traditsionnogo Prirodopol’zovania Korennikh Malochislennikh 
Narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dalnego Vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii).16 
These two laws define land use for communities with Indigenous 
status: the former legalizes kinship-based economic cooperatives, or 
obshchinas,17 as legal entities with privileges in managing designated 
their home communities. In 1992, a parliamentary committee was formed to develop 
federal legislation that would address the rights of KMN, whose work concluded 
in 1999 with the passing of the federal law N 82-FZ. See G. Fondahl, O. Lazebnik, 
and G. Poelzer, “Aboriginal Territorial Rights and the Sovereignty of the Sakha 
Republic,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 41, no. 6 (2000): 404.
16. The Russian term territorii traditsionnogo prirodopol’zovania is translated in this 
work as “territories of traditional nature use.” Scholars also translate this term as 
“territories of traditional/historical inhabitancy” or “original homelands.” These 
territories extend over the Arctic and sub-Arctic territories, embracing the lands 
from the Kola Peninsula in the West to the Bering Strait in the East. In the South, 
these lands stretch to the Amur River and Sakhalin Island. They mark the territories 
considered traditional areas of settlement of Indigenous groups; the boundaries are 
defined in the legislature. However, these territories do not necessarily comply 
with the existing areas of residence of Indigenous communities.
17. The term obshchina (from the Russian “commune”) captures forms of historical 
organization of traditional economies of Indigenous Peoples. These economies 
relied on the principle of kinship as the key norm for managing property and land. 
Today, ventures registered as an obshchina are formed around family and/or kin 
ties and focused on traditional forms of subsistence. The members of an obshchina 
do not pay taxes, since their ventures are not registered as commercial entities. The 
changes to the laws, however, placed some communities in the position where they 
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lands; the latter reserves lands for traditional subsistence activities of 
Indigenous communities administered by their members.18 In addition, 
a number of federal codes protect the rights of KMN to use natural 
resources for subsistence, including: “On Fauna” of 1995 (in Russian, 
O Faune), “On Fishing and the Preservation of Aquatic Biological 
Resources” of 2004 (in Russian, O Ribolovstve i Sokhranenii Vodnikh 
Biologicheskikh Resursov), and “On Hunting and the Preservation of 
Hunting Resources and on the Introduction of Revisions into Several 
Legal Acts of the Russian Federation” of 2009 (in Russian, Ob 
Okhote i o Sokhranenii Okhotnichikh Resursov i o Vnesenii Izmeneniy 
v Otdelnie Zakonodatelnie Akti). With the changes introduced by 
Vladimir Putin’s government, all main federal laws were amended: 
articles and whole clauses were removed from the original laws, and 
so were the codes in particular areas of law. These changes limited and 
in some cases annulled the rights of Indigenous Peoples.
2000s-Today
The changes to Indigenous rights legislation happened as a part of 
more profound modifications to the mechanisms of governing federal-
regional politics. Since the moment of Vladimir Putin’s ascendancy 
to power, the administration of political rights of nationalities have 
been increasingly defined within the parameters of state security. 
While initially, the move was a response to the waves of nationalism 
during the 1990s,19 with time the federal decision to consolidate 
should rent the lands they use for their traditional subsistence practices registered 
as obshchina since 2009. For more on this, see Yakel, supra note 12, at 10. 
18. In some regions, the members of the economic enterprises who register their venture 
as an obshchina may receive regional subsidies. Likewise, economic ventures 
located on the lands designated as the “territories of traditional nature use” may 
receive support from the regional government to maintain their traditional practices. 
These practices primarily consist of agricultural activities, fishing and/or hunting, 
and reindeer herding. Please see the part III of this work for a discussion of the 
degree to which these measures support the economic wellbeing of communities. 
19. A history of struggles between the federal government and nationalist leaders during 
the early years of transitioning Russia contributed to the political course taken by 
the current Russian president. The events of the 1990s revealed the fragility of the 
central government to the pressures of regional ethnic leaders in the moments of 
transition. These struggles also demonstrated that the ethnic leaders would place 
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political authority transformed into what appears today as the federal 
government’s desire to “drive ethnicity out of politics,” as one scholar 
described it.20 Moreover, the structural arrangements of the Russian 
federal state were initially supportive of centralization. Graham Smith, 
for example, in his 1996 examination of the governing system of 
the new Russian state, saw it as a “highly centralized federation.”21 
Smith was particularly concerned with the problem of lacking social 
commitment to accommodate diverse and at times conflicting interests 
of the different nationalities composing the Russian state. Smith 
envisioned a turn to autocracy, which would be supported not only 
by structural arrangements of state governance, but also by the very 
attitude of the political leaders toward managing relations between 
different cultural communities. 
The question of security over resource revenues, an especially 
prominent issue after the 1998 financial crisis, was also of prime 
significance to the federal decision to centralize political power.22 In fact, 
evidence suggests that in the area of Indigenous issues, the government’s 
interest in profiting from the use of natural resources located on the lands 
of Indigenous groups had informed the core changes in the policies 
governing Indigenous rights. The fundamental role of hydrocarbons 
their own interests before those of the state, and, if possible, would seek secession 
(as was particularly evident in the case of Chechnya). The internal competition 
for power at the moment of Vladimir Putin’s ascendance might have shaped the 
president’s perception of threat to both the territorial integrity of the state and his 
security as a leader, as suggested by one scholar. See R. Sakwa, Putin Redux: Power 
and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 16.
20. A. Osipov, “National Cultural Autonomy in Russia: A Case of Symbolic 
Law,” Review of Central and East European Law 35, no. 1 (2010): 46.
21. G. Smith, “Russia, Ethnoregionalism and the Politics of Federation,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 19, no. 2 (1996): 392.
22. Federal government officials secured control over economic production, particularly 
in the areas of oil and gas. They issued provisions that helped to control the levies on 
exports of oil and gas, and non-ferrous metals. See: H. Oversloot, “The Homogeneity 
of Russia, or the Remains of an Empire (Federalism and Regionalism),” in Managing 
Ethnic Diversity in Russia, eds. O. Protsyk and B. Harzl (London: Routledge, 2013), 
93; M. Olsen, “The Future of National Oil Companies in Russia and How They May 
Improve Their Global Competitiveness,” Houston Journal of International Law 35 
(2013): 620–621, 645. This move helped the federal authorities to exert control over 
the operation of major national oil companies and thus secure their independence 
from the regions that are rich in resources.
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in the Russian economy explains why the federal government strives 
to control these profits.23 In 2015, for example, revenues from oil and 
natural gas accounted for more than 40% of federal budget revenues.24 
At the same time, the government’s interest in profiting from industrial 
development in Indigenous territories has exposed Indigenous 
communities to the dangers associated with industrial developments. 
The changes to the Forest, Land, and Water codes, which specify the 
principles for using forests and water resources, placed Indigenous 
groups in a position where they have to rent the territories allocated 
for their traditional subsistence and cultural practices (i.e., those 
designated as “territories of traditional nature use,” herein TTNU),25 
and at times compete with companies who also have a right to license 
the land where Indigenous Peoples reside. These provisions are valid 
even on the lands designated for the communities’ traditional forms 
of subsistence. For example, in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug—
homeland to Indigenous Khant and Mansi—industrial developments 
are taking place on almost half of the territories designed as TTNU, 
with hundreds of extraction licenses issued to dozens of companies.26 
23. Some of the developments in this direction were visible in the original laws. For 
example, the federal law “On Subsoil” (1992) is designed to protect the interests 
of both Indigenous communities and the commercial parties involved. Given that 
the law does not guarantee priority of Indigenous communities to extract resources 
located on the territories they inhabit, the law primarily protects the interests of 
industries. The federal law “On Production Sharing Agreements” (1995) further 
specifies that the use of lands with a status of “a territory of traditional nature use” 
could only be possible with the permission of the authorities of a region. 
24. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Russia, (2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/
russia.pdf. Further, Russian researchers project that the situation will not change 
in the next 25 years, with gas becoming a commodity accounting for the “most 
substantial” increase in consumption. See The Energy Research Institute of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. Global and Russian Energy Outlook up to 2040, 
(2013), http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/1156.pdf. These projections rest upon 
the estimations of resource potential in the Russian Arctic, which is comparable 
to that of the United States. See National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: 
Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, (2015): 12, Fig. ES-4.
25. Ibid., 10–9; J. Rohr, “Indigenous Peoples in the Russian Federation,” IWGIA 
Report 18 (2014): 13.
26. In 2006, for example, 673 licenses were given to 61 companies. See L. Alferova, 
“Legal Provisions for Safeguarding the Rights of Indigenous Minorities of the 
North in the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Region (Yugra), in Relation to 
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Further, the current laws also free companies from the responsibility to 
secure the wellbeing of communities whose lifestyles and subsistence 
practices may be disturbed by the proposed and/or ongoing industrial 
projects that may cause environmental degradation.27 Initially, two 
measures were created to ensure environmental safety of Indigenous 
communities—one involving ethnological and the other addressing 
ecological kinds of expertise. The ethnological expertise, created as 
an instrument to implement the provisions of the federal law N 82-FZ, 
guaranteed equal representation of interests by involving Indigenous 
Peoples in the scientific assessment of the potential consequences 
of economic development to their home communities. This kind of 
expertise, as the Russian legal scholar Yulia Yakel stresses, is practiced 
for the most part voluntarily and is not considered a requirement.28 The 
development of ecological expertise originated in 1995 as a means 
of implementing the federal law “On Ecological Expertise.” The 
measure lost its power in 2006; the law no longer stipulates that expert 
involvement is necessary in possible prevention and/or assessment of 
the socio-economic changes emergent from industrial projects.29 In the 
cases of environmental damage resulting from the use of territories 
registered as TTNU, responsible parties must pay compensation to the 
communities living on these territories.30 However, the compensation 
often cannot cover the damages done to the land, which communities 
may no longer use for subsistence practices after the company leaves. 
Given a history of industrial companies’ environmental rights violations 
against Indigenous communities,31 scholars express concern over the 
Protection of Their Ancestral Lands, Traditional Ways of Life, and Livelihood 
Activities,” Sibirica 5, no. 2 (2006): 157.
27. Yakel, supra note 12, at 18.
28. Ibid., 10.
29. See N. Novikova, “Vzaimodeystvie Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov 
i Promishlennikh Kompaniy,” [Russian: Взаимодействие Коренных 
Малочисленных Народов и Промышленных Компаний] in Sever i Severiane 
[Russian: Север и Северяне] eds. N. Novikova and D. Funk, (2012), 23.
30. Alferova, supra note 26, at 157.
31. For an overview on this history, consult J. Agyeman and Y. Ogneva-
Himmelberger, Environmental Justice and Sustainability in the Former Soviet 
Union (Cambridge, United States of America: The MIT Press, 2009). Elena 
Dubinina gives a suggestive case study of the violations of environmental rights of 
Indigenous communities living in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. See E. Dubinina, 
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future of Indigenous groups, particularly those located in the Arctic, the 
core territory targeted for current and future industrial developments by 
the Russian government.32 This area is also home to about one third of 
the entire Russian Indigenous population, or close to 82,500 people.33 
The recent changes to federal means of administration of Indigenous 
issues further impeded possibilities of implementing Indigenous rights 
by elimination of the federal agencies dealing directly with the issues 
of Indigenous Peoples and budget cuts. In 2000, the Goskomsever 
(State Committee for the North of Russia) was abolished. In 2011, 
the North and Indigenous Peoples Issues Committee of the Council of 
the Russian Federation also ceased to exist.34 Until 2014, Indigenous 
issues remained under the management of the Ministry of Regional 
Development, which was also abolished that year. Since 2015, the 
Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs (in Russian, Agenstvo po 
Delam Natsional’nostey), created that year, oversees Indigenous 
issues as a part of the Agency’s work on the nationalities issues.35 
The Agency is an executive body that administers and enforces 
existing laws and is directly subordinate to the president. Igor 
Barinov, previously the Federal Security Services colonel, heads the 
Agency. Some Russian scholars believe that Barinov was chosen for 
this position partly in response to the core purpose of contemporary 
nationality policies to eliminate influences of “ethnic” leaders on the 
Impact of the Oil and Gas Industry on Human Security: Relation Between the 
National and the Human: Case Study: the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Russia, 
Master’s thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Tromsø, (2008). 
32. The Arctic, along with regions of the Far North and Eastern Siberia, accounts 
for about 90% of gas and oil, 85% of lead and platinum, 80% of carbon and 
molybdenum, 71% of nickel, 69% of copper, 44% of silver and 40% of gold of all 
Russian reserves. See E. Nikitina, “Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
to Save Their Traditional Activities in the Russian Federation,” in Challenges for 
Governance Structures in Urban and Regional Development, E. Hepperle, et al. 
eds. (Zurich: European Academy of Land Use and Development, 2015), 331.
33. V. Tishkov, N. Novikova, and E. Pivneva, “Indigenous Peoples of the Russian 
Arctic,” Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 85, no. 3 (2015): 278.
34. Kryazhkov, supra note 12, at 148–9.
35. V. Putin, Ukaz Presidenta o Federal’nom Agentstve po Delam Natsional’nostey, 
[Russian: Указ Президента о Федеральном Агентстве по Делам 
Национальностей] N 168 (March 15, 2015), http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/
online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=177296#0 
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state governance.36 A brief analysis of the proposed distribution of the 
Agency’s budget suggests that Indigenous issues are not a priority 
of its work. Out of about 40 billion rubles the Agency requested to 
finance its programs for 2017–2025, less than 7% of the budget, or 
about 2.7 billion rubles, have been allocated for Indigenous issues. By 
comparison, the Agency plans to spend 4.2 billion rubles, or 10.5% 
of the total budget, for measures on the “prevention of extremism” 
(Russian: profilaktika ekstremizma), and 11.2 billion rubles, or 28% 
of the total budget, for the development of a state-social partnership 
(in Russian, gosudarstevenno-obschetvennoe partnerstvo).37 The 
Agency’s relative disregard of the needs of Indigenous communities 
corresponds to the larger position of the federal government on 
Indigenous issues, given that the amount of funding allocated for this 
area has been declining since 2009. Then the amount allocated for the 
management of Indigenous issues was 600 million rubles or about 20 
million dollars. The current sum, in comparison, is about 337.5 million 
rubles annually, or a little over 5.6 million dollars, which is a little 
less than the amount allocated in 2016 of 390 million rubles, or about 
6.4 million dollars.38 Given that since 2008, the federal government 
directly subsidizes the regions with Indigenous populations instead 
of using the targeted program approach utilized previously (which is 
no longer active due in part to corruption),39 the Indigenous residents 
36. Some Russian scholars define the core of these policies as a strategy of “permanent 
intervention at the actor level [federal appointments to the power positions], 
with zero tolerance for ethnic violence; prosecution of ‘unauthorized’ nationalist 
movements, organizations, and leaders; and a ban on ethnic political parties.” See 
A. Shcherbak and K. Sych, “Trends in Russian Nationalities Policy,” Problems of 
Post-Communism, 63 (2016): 15. 
37. N. Gorodetskaya, “Natsional’noy Politike Nazvali Druguyu Tsenu,” [Russian: 
Национальной Политике Назвали Другую Цену] in Kommersant, (2016), http://
kommersant.ru/doc/3075511. 
38. A/HRC/15/37/Add.5; and A. Mezjenko, “Sokhranenie Traditsionnogo Uklada Zhizni 
Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dalnego Vostoka Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, Prozhivayushchikh v Rossiyskoy Arktike,” [Russian: Сохранение 
Традиционного Уклада Жизни Коренных Малочисленных Народов Севера, 
Сибири и Дальнего Востока Российской Федерации, Проживающих в 
Российской Арктике] presented at the Conference on the Economic Development 
of the Arctic, Saint-Petersburg, Russian Federation, (June 18, 2016), http://arctic-
conference.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mezjenko.pdf. 
39. The Chairman of the Federation Council at the Federal Assembly of Russia, 
Vyacheslav Shtyrov, for example, reports that the three federal funding programs 
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of the subjects that directly depend on federal funding to support 
Indigenous communities—such as the Tuva and Komi republics—will 
likely continue to experience severe poverty. In part, the cuts express 
a critical attitude of federal authorities to the programs supporting 
Indigenous traditional activities, since these programs bring no profit.40 
The changes to the federal laws and means of administration of 
Indigenous affairs influenced the governments of the Russian subjects 
to amend their legal provisions, thus limiting the rights of Indigenous 
groups guaranteed to these communities by the legislation of the 
subjects. One of the measures that affected Indigenous communities 
most was the termination in 2004 of the right of federal subjects 
to create representation quotas for Indigenous communities in the 
subjects’ governments. The system of quotas, which originated in the 
Soviet era, supports political opportunities of non-Russian nationalities 
living in the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the 1990s, it 
ensured Indigenous representation in the regional governments in a 
number of post-Soviet subjects: Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 
(herein KMAO), the Sakha Republic, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Republic of Buryatia, the 
Altai Republic, and also in Dagestan.41 The governments of these 
targeting Indigenous issues since 1991 have been implemented inconsistently in 
part due to corruption. See Vyacheslav Shtyrov, “Gosudarstevennaya Politika v 
Oblasti Obespecheniya Ustoychivogo Razvitiya Korennikh Malochislennikh 
Narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” [Russian: 
Государственная Политика в Области Обеспечения Устойчивого Развития 
Коренных Малочисленных Народов Севера, Сибири и Дальнего Востока 
Российской Федерации.] in Sovremennoe Sostoyanie i Puti Razvitiya Korennikh 
Malochislennikh Narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii. [Russian: Современное Состояние и Пути Развития Коренных 
Малочисленных Народов Севера, Сибири и Дальнего Востока Российской 
Федерации], Vyacheslav Shtyrov ed. (2012), 17–8.
40. A. Shapovalov, “Straightening Out the Backward Legal Regulation of ‘Backward’ 
Peoples’ Claims to Land in the Russian North: The Concept of Indigenous 
Neomodernism,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 17, no. 3 
(2005): 435.
41. A.A. Ivanchenko et al., “Natsional’nie Kvoti -Modifikatsiya Izbiratel’noy 
Sistemi s Tsel’iu Zaschiti Prav Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov,” [Russian: 
Национальные Квоты – Модификация Избирательной Системы с Целью 
Защиты Прав Коренных Малочисленных Народов] in Proportsionalnaya Sistema 
v Rossii: Istoria, Sovremennoe Sostyanie, Perspektivi [Russian: Пропорциональная 
Избирательная Система в России: История, Современное Состояние, 
Перспективы], part 1.4 (2005), http://www.vibory.ru/Publikat/PES/ch-1-4.htm.
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subjects used a system of single-member electoral districts to ensure 
representation of Indigenous politicians in the regional legislative 
assemblies. For example, in KMAO, six out of 23 deputies in 1996 
were Indigenous; five out of 25 deputies in 2001 were selected by this 
principle to the KMAO government. In Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug, three out of 21deputies were Indigenous in both 1996 and 2001, 
and three out of 22 were Indigenous in 2005. In Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug, five out of 15 deputies were Indigenous in 1994, 1996, and 
2001.42 Likewise, in Sakha, the single-member electoral districts 
originally designated 12 out of 70 seats in the legislative assembly of 
the republic to the Indigenous Evenks.43 The new norms of regulating 
the subjects’ parliaments led to the electoral districts becoming larger. 
To form single-member districts in the areas designated as traditional 
homelands of the KMN became, according to one Russian scholar, 
impossible.44 In the Nenets Autonomous Okrug the quota system was 
annulled in 2005 by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation, which found the provision invalid.45 Likewise, in Yamalo-
Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the changes happened in 2009, and in 
KMAO this happened very recently in 2015. In other subjects, the 
governments also no longer guarantee quota-based representation to 
Indigenous politicians in their institutions of governances.46
42. Ibid.
43. N. Filippova, “Predstavitel’stvo Natsionalnikh Men’shinstv v Sisteme Publichnogo 
Predstavitel’stva,” [Russian: Представительство Национальных Меньшинств 
в Системе Публичного Представительства], Konstitutsionnoe i Munitsipalnoe 
Pravo 9 (2015): 25. 
44. Ibid., 25–26. 
45. A Malyy, “O Roli Organov Mestnogo Samoupravl’eniya v Realizatsii Prav 
Malochislennikh Narodov Rossii,” [Russian: О Роли Органов Местного 
Самоуправления в Реализации Прав Малочисленных Народов России], 
in University Proceedings. Volga Regions. Social Sciences 2, no. 38 (2016): 13; 
N. Filippova, “Natsia i Natsional’nie Men’shinstva v Parlamentakh: Ot XX k XXI 
Veky,” [Russian: Нация и Национальные Меньшинства в Парламентах: От XX 
к XXI Веку], Scientific Yearly Periodical of The Institute of Philosophy and Law 
of The Russian Academy of Sciences, Ural Branch 14, no.2 (2014): 151.
46. See respectively Filippova, supra note 43, at 24; Gosudarstvennaya Duma 
Yamalo-Nenetskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga, O Vnesenii Izmeneniya v Zakon 
Yamalo-Nenetskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga, [Russian: О Внесении Изменения 
в Закон Ямало-Ненецкого Автономного Округа “О Выборах Депутатов 
Государственной Думы Ямало-Ненецкого Автономного Округа” 
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The final factors which affect political and legal rights of Indigenous 
Peoples stem from measures targeting the limitation of political 
autonomy of the Russian subjects, particularly from the creation of 
the regime of law enforcement and the policy on mergers. The regime 
of law enforcement, constructed to secure federal powers on the 
regional levels, focused primarily on placing federal control over the 
appointments of prosecutors, judges, and, to a lesser degree, police 
officials.47 As Moscow-appointed administrators took control over a 
number of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the regionally elected 
leaders were removed from their positions in the governments of the 
subjects as well as from the upper house of the Parliament. Today, the 
majority of the highest-ranking officials in the subjects are, as a rule, 
(Утратил Силу с 06.07.2009 на Основании Закона Ямало-Ненецкого 
Автономного Округа от) 19.06.2009 N 51-ЗАО], (2009), http://docs.cntd.ru/
document/800112559; and N. Kurganov, “Yugorskaya Duma Otmenila Kvoti 
dl’ia Predstavitel’eiy Korennikh Narodov,” [Russian: Югорская Дума Отменила 
Квоты для Представителей Коренных Народов] UralPolitRu (2015), http://
uralpolit.ru/news/hmao/09-12-2015/70210. 
47. The move was a response to the preceding post-Soviet measures of regulating 
federal-regional political relations. Thus, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
governing powers were passed to the chairmen of the regional executive committees 
(ispolkomi), functioning as parts of the Councils of People’s Deputies who were 
elected in 1990. In 1991, the new position of “head of administration” was created, 
which became the governor position in all regions except for republics, whose 
leaders called themselves presidents. In 1992, President Boris Yel’tsin appointed 
governors in all regions except for seven republics, who had elected their presidents. 
By the late 1990s, President Yel’tsin had to yield to the pressures of the regional 
leaders and allow direct elections for the first time in most regions of Russia. This 
occurred between the fall of 1996 and the spring of 1997. The 1999 federal law 
established rules for electing regional governors, and eliminated the right of the 
president to remove or appoint governors. President Vladimir Putin cancelled this 
ruling in 2004. The current system of appointing governors, first to be nominated 
by the President, was then instituted. In addition, the president appointed special 
representatives to oversee governance of each of the seven Federal okrugs of the 
state; wherein okrugs are mere units of administration created in 2000 in support 
of strengthening the powers of federal authorities. For a detailed discussion and 
analysis of the professional backgrounds of the elected and appointed governors for 
this period (1992–2010), see N. Buckley, et al., “The Political Economy of Russian 
Gubernatorial Election and Appointment,” Europe Asia Studies, 66 no.8 (2014): 
1218–1220. For an analysis of centralization measures, consult Oversloot, supra 
note 22, at 93–103. For the discussion of the implications of centralization on the 
regional and local governance, see B. Krug, and A. Libman, “Commitment to Local 
Autonomy in Non-Democracies: Russia and China Compared,” Constitutional 
Political Economy 26, no. 2 (2015): 221–245. 
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born outside of the area they serve; the appointed governors, likewise, 
tend to come from the federal bureaucracy.48 Given the professional 
background and the personal aspirations of these officials, they tend 
to use the instruments of governance to serve the interests of federal 
government while advancing their own careers. The interests of the 
people, whose lives they administer, are thus not their first priority; 
often federal appointments create barriers for non-Russian and local 
leaders to implement the existing provisions that support minority 
rights. At times, the implementation of these rights, especially in 
regions rich with oil, jeopardizes the government’s interest in profiting 
from industrial development in Indigenous territories. These changes 
led to the increasingly pervasive abuse of Indigenous rights by regional 
and local administrations. 
The policy on mergers (in Russian, uplotnenie) further stripped 
Indigenous communities of political opportunities. The representation 
of subjects in the Russian federal structure remains predominantly 
territorial. While a little over one third of the 83 subject territories of 
Russia are defined by ethnic criteria—the 22 republics and now four 
autonomous okrugs49—only in okrugs are groups with Indigenous 
status recognized as those residing on their homeland territories with 
a formal right to govern these territories. Until 2007, the number of 
okrugs was seven; that year, three autonomous okrugs originally created 
as homelands for Indigenous groups, were abolished: the Koryak, the 
Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets), and the Evenk okrugs were merged into the 
Russian-dominated Krasnoyarsk and Kamchatka Territories.50 Despite 
that, this right has, in essence, not been actualized given the structural 
difficulties and the current means of administrating the state. Reducing 
the number of okrugs from seven to four51 lessened the already limited 
48. What is noteworthy here is that the share of non-Russian nationalities among the 
governors remains at a high 80%. See Buckley et al., supra note 47, at 1214, 
1229. This 80% signifies a trait of continuation of the Soviet practice of appointing 
leaders of the non-Russian Peoples from the nationalities whose interests they were 
to represent. At the same time, the nationality alone is not a sufficient condition to 
guarantee that a leader would support the interests of the Peoples of the region.
49. This number does not include the contested territories in Ukraine. 
50. Rohr, supra note 25, at 26.
51. These are Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
(both okrugs are constituent parts of Tumen’ Oblast), Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
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political choices of Indigenous politicians. The possibility of further 
mergers in the near future is real.52 
c)  Structural Factors Contributing to Inequality
The effects of structural violence on Indigenous communities 
were made more severe by the structural factors that have historically 
contributed to the political and social inequality of Indigenous groups, 
with the wide geographical distribution of Indigenous communities 
being the primary factor. The widely-dispersed patterns of living, 
prominent among many Indigenous communities today, historically 
prevented Indigenous persons from relying on instruments of state 
administration to solve problems in their communities. Despite the 
original vision of the Soviet leaders to create a state based upon 
the principle of self-determination of all nations, Soviet Indigenous 
communities were forced to adapt to the Soviet system of governance. 
The territorial-administrative division of the Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic did not correspond to the geographical locations of diverse 
and politically autonomous Indigenous groups. The forcible Soviet 
resettlement projects further contributed to a situation in which 
members of one people became demographical minorities living 
in different administrative units of Soviet Russia, governed by the 
members of the associated political party.
Today, members of Indigenous communities are located in 27 of 83 
subject territories of the federation. They do not constitute a majority in 
any of the regions of the Russian Federation, including the autonomous 
okrugs: Indigenous populations comprise less than 4% of the total 
population of the northern regions.53 Only in Koryak Okrug, whose 
(a part of Arkhangelsk Oblast) and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug (created in 1930 as a homeland to the Chukchi, native 
to Chukotka) was a constituent part of Magadan Oblast since 1953. It gained 
independence from the Oblast in 1992 and since then remains only one of four 
okrugs of the Russian Federation with no subordinate host region. 
52. See Oversloot, supra note 22, at 98–110; and Derrick, M. “The Merging of Russian’s 
Regions as Applied Nationality Policy: A Suggested Rationale,” Caucasian Review 
of International Affairs 3, no. 3 (2009): 317.
53. Tishkov, Novikova, and Pivneva, supra note 33, at 279. This number remains relatively 
steady for the 26 original Indigenous communities: Kozlov and Lisitsyn report that in 
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autonomous status was recently abolished, and in Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, does the population of KMN exceed 25% of the total, with 
the share of KMN being 40.3% and 30.7% respectively.54 These data, 
however, signify that these regions are overall sparsely populated. Even 
on the lands designated for traditional subsistence practices, Indigenous 
populations are frequently a demographic minority. For example, in 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Indigenous communities constitute 
only 11% of the total population residing on lands with TTNU status.55 
Further, Indigenous persons sometimes find themselves as residents 
of homelands designated to a group to which they do not belong. For 
example, some of the Even, the Dolgan, the Chuckchi, and the Yukagir 
historically resided in the lands of what is now the Sakha Republic. 
With the institution of the Soviet system in Sakha (Soviet Yakutia), 
they found themselves under the administration of the ethnic Sakha 
people and Russian authorities, which remains the case today. 
These widely dispersed patterns of living resulted in Indigenous 
communities being under the control of administrations that are not 
of their own choosing, as a rule. While this was the case during the 
Soviet era, the Soviet means of governance ensured some uniformity 
in the ways in which Indigenous persons were treated with no regard 
to the place of their residence as long as they were Soviet citizens. 
Further, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new subjects 
of the transitioning Russian state found themselves free to construct 
their own laws and tools of governance for most of the 1990s. As 
a result, different subjects constructed their approach to protecting 
Indigenous rights according to the degree to which this new body 
of laws supported the interests of those who found themselves at the 
helm of the new subject’s government. Formally, all subjects of the 
1989, the share of Indigenous persons in the northern regions was 4.4%, resulting in 
part from a continuous migration to the North since the 1930s. See A. Kozlov and D. 
Lisitsyn. “Arctic Russia,” in Health Transitions in Arctic Populations, T.K. Young and 
P. Bjerregaard, P. eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 86. 
54. A. Petrov, “Lost Generations? Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the 
Post-Soviet Era,” Canadian Studies in Population 35, no. 2 (2008): 277.
55. E. Pivneva, “Khanty-Mansiyskiy Avtonomniy Okrug –Yugra,” [Russian: Ханты-
Мансийский Автономный Округ – ЮГРА] in Sever i Severiane [Russian: Север 
и Северяне] N. Novikova N. and D. Funk eds. (2012), 85.
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Russian Federation had to comply with federal regulations. However, 
the interpretation of these regulations at the regional level depended, 
among other factors, on the priorities of the regional government. As 
a result, the situation of Indigenous groups often depends on the ways 
in which regional authorities treat the question of Indigenous rights. 
To illustrate, in Tuva (home to the Tuvinian-Tozhin communities), 
and the Komi (home to the Khant, the Mansi, and the Nenets), no 
mechanisms designed specifically in support of Indigenous rights are 
available.56 In Sakha, on the other hand, a number of measures were 
created, including the designation of seats for Indigenous persons in 
the State assembly. Given how small and widely dispersed Indigenous 
communities are, it is very difficult for Indigenous leaders to institute 
changes to the ways in which their lives are administered at the regional 
and federal levels today, as the next part of this work demonstrates. 
To conclude, the current approach of the Russian government to 
Indigenous issues reflects the values and interests of the authorities 
currently in positions of power. Despite the changes in the regime 
of governance, the present modes of federal services to Russian 
Indigenous communities remain similar to those offered to these 
communities during the Soviet era. The treatment of Indigenous 
issues stemming from the Soviet approach to the rights of the groups 
currently recognized to have Indigenous status, does not focus on the 
creation of politically and culturally autonomous communities. Instead, 
Indigenous groups remain dependent on federal aid and services and 
are subject to a range of rights violations. To change this situation, the 
Russian government must support the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It must create measures that would 
formally and systematically address political, economic, cultural and 
social interests of Indigenous communities on all levels, and would 
enable Indigenous leaders to make decisions about the future of the 
communities who elect them. Indigenous issues must be addressed as 
an integral part of Russian nationality policies, and as an integral part 
56. To make this estimation, the author consulted the texts of the Constitutions of 
these republics available at the website of the consortium Kodeks at http://docs.
cntd.ru/document/906705011. The author also used official webpages of the 
governments of these republics to examine administrative structures of these 
republics’ governments.
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of the opportunity to construct a system of governance based upon 
values of multiculturalism. 
II. Means of Resistance to Structural Violence:  
Indigenous Politics 
This essay examines the political upheavals among Indigenous 
communities during the post-Soviet period. It argues that despite 
a somewhat prevalent scholarly perception of these struggles as 
elements of a movement, these upheavals never developed into an 
organized statewide set of actions in support of Indigenous rights. Nor 
did the leaders of these upheavals pursue goals that would allow one to 
characterize their mobilizations as components of a unified Indigenous 
struggle, given that the core element of indigeneity signifies a right 
to self-determined political existence of a group. These upheavals, 
by their consequences, were abortive struggles primarily focused 
on amending a local situation, economic conditions and/or political 
opportunities of particular communities. At the same time, these 
struggles supported the development of Indigenous professional 
politics, which remains the main form of Indigenous advocacy today. 
This essay reviews cases of rural protests, Indigenous mobilizations 
focused on recognition of a community to Indigenous status, and 
struggles for greater political opportunities for Indigenous leaders. It 
uses a socio-historical perspective to analyze these political upheavals 
and to demonstrate that the abortive character of these upheavals a) 
resulted from the specific historic circumstances within which these 
upheavals took place; and b) reinforced contemporary forms of 
violence against Indigenous communities. 
a) Indigenous Political Mobilizations in  
Post-Soviet Russia: Cases
Political upheavals took place in numerous Indigenous communities 
during the 1980s and 1990s, in parallel with other political mobilizations 
of ethnic groups living in Russia. A number of factors generated these 
upheavals. First, they originated in the overall political climate of the 
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Soviet Union during the late 1980s. This was the time of liberalization 
reforms, initiated by the last General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, Michael Gorbachev. The decisions of the 1989 
September Plenum session of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party in particular stressed the development of programs to ensure 
equal cultural and political rights to all nations and nationalities.57 The 
economic instability of this period also contributed to the political 
climate in the country, as did changes in Soviet foreign policies. 
These factors instigated criticism, primarily in the popular press, of 
the cultural and ecological rights abuses occurring against Indigenous 
Peoples, which in turn found a response across many communities in 
the form of political unrest.58 
The political climate of the late 1980s also liberated the voices of 
Indigenous leaders who, during Soviet times, might have been charged 
with nationalism and imprisoned for their advocacy.59 These leaders 
sometimes found themselves in the position of being the alternative 
to the party officials, representing the interests of their people at the 
levels of local, regional and, in a few cases, federal governance. 
This position allowed them to participate in the development of 
Indigenous rights legislation during the time of transition, influencing 
the transformation of Indigenous mobilizations into professional 
advocacy. While instances of political events among Indigenous 
communities are not well studied, a few documented cases provide 
some understanding of the character and the outcomes of these protests. 
Three different kinds of mobilizations, classified by the goals of these 
57. A. Chemchieva, Altaiskie Subetnosi v Poiskakh Identichnosti. [Russian: 
Aлтайские Субэтносы в Поисках Идентичности] (2012), 15.
58. For example, Severnye Prostori, an all-state journal published annually since 
1985, became one of the main sources to which Indigenous persons would write 
to share their grievances. In 1994, another all-state journal, Zjivaya Arktika, was 
established; in 1999, it became the main journal of RAIPON. 
59. For example, most of the Shors intellectuals were charged with nationalists’ 
crimes and their work was destroyed. Other forms of discrimination included 
forced assimilation, hate crimes, and the ecological war against these groups in 
the form of industrial developments of their lands, which led to the destruction of 
their traditional lifestyles and falling numbers of their reindeer. See N. Vakhtin, 
“Native Peoples of the Russian Far North, in Polar Peoples: Self-determination and 
Development,” in Polar Peoples: Self Determination and Development, Minority 
Rights Group ed. (1994), 67, 52. 
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mobilizations, are chosen for this study: rural protests, targeting needs 
and grievances of particular village communities; struggles focused 
on gaining Indigenous (i.e., that of korennie malochislennie narodi) 
status for communities not included in the original list of the 26 small-
numbered peoples of the North; and political activities intended to 
expand political and legal rights of Russian Indigenous Peoples. 
i) Rural protests
A number of Indigenous protests took place in rural areas during 
the 1980s and 1990s. A few cases are particularly demonstrative of 
the abortive character of these struggles: a protest of the rural Koryak 
against the liquidation of their village, Paren’, in Kamchatka in 1986; 
the Nanai villagers’ campaign against building tourist establishments 
on the land of their village, Sikachi-Alyan, Khabarovskii Kray, in 1989; 
and an appeal of the Itelmen from the Kovran village, in Kamchatka, 
to the United Nations to help restore electricity in the village in 1993. 
In the case of the Koryak villagers, local officials found the village 
costly to sustain because of its location, accessible only by helicopter, 
and proposed the villagers relocate to a larger settlement. The villagers 
refused. They contacted local press and, having publicized their 
grievances, won their case and were left to decide their future for 
themselves.60 However, the village continued to deteriorate; the place 
remains in squalid conditions to this day.61 The protest, while generating 
a response to a particular problem, did not initiate substantial changes 
in the lives of villagers. 
The second 1989 case saw the Nanai villagers of Sikachi-Alyan lobby 
the regional administration in opposition to the building of private 
vacation homes and tourist establishments on the territory of their village 
60. Ibid., 70–71. 
61. In the 2000s, the situation of the village became catastrophic: the village, which 
at that time consisted of little over 60 people, had not received any food supplies 
for some time; electricity was available for only a few hours a day; the village had 
scarce means of communication; and the village had no doctors. The appeal to the 
Indigenous rights organization RAIPON and to the regional press and television 
helped the villagers get food supplies and medical assistance. See T. Efremenko, 
“Agonia Parenya,” [Russian: Агония Пареня] on Lenta.ru. (2010), https://lenta.
ru/articles/2010/07/02/paren/. The village still maintains its existence.
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and the surrounding grounds. They demanded the return of lands taken 
from the village in the 1960s.62 The villagers organized a Soviet-style 
committee, selsoviet (village council), to govern their affairs and refused 
to follow decisions of local officials. Since then, the council remains the 
main decision-making body at the village. Yet, no larger changes to the 
lives of villagers have taken place since 1989 apart from the work on the 
protection of a heritage site located close to the village. This site, which 
has petroglyphs dated between 12,000–9000 BC, is now included in the 
tentative list of UNESCO World Heritage Sites.63 Today, the head of the 
village would like to establish a tourist center in the village to support 
the village economy and to care for the site.64 
In the 1993 case, the Itelmen of Kovran village of the then-Koryak 
Autonomous Okrug appealed to the United Nations asking for help in 
sustaining their lives, as they had been left with almost no electrical 
power and severe food shortages. Local and regional administrations 
disregarded their problems, and were difficult to contact because of 
poor means of communication. The local teachers tried to alleviate their 
situation by appealing to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Geneva. Supported by foreign scholars working in the village, they 
composed a letter in which they described their difficulties. In a few 
months, local authorities restored the electrical power in the village, 
which suggests that their pleas were heard.65 Today, the village is 
known primarily for its cultural events revitalized in part by activists 
and cultural leaders.66 Similarly to the other two cases, the struggle was 
brief, did not spread outside of the immediate site of protest, and targeted 
only local problems. Thus, all three protests helped their respective 
situations as short-term interventions. They supported the development 
62. Vakhtin, supra note 59, at 70.
63. UNESCO, “Petroglyphs of Sikachi-Alyan,” (2003), http://whc.unesco.org/en/
tentativelists/1787/.
64. Khabarovskiy Kray Segodnia, “Petroglifi Nuzjno Vklyгchit’ v Spisok Naslediya 
UNESCO,” [Russian: Петроглифы Нужно Включить в Список Наследия 
ЮНЕСКО] (2016), http://todaykhv.ru/news/culture/1678/. 
65. D. Koester, “Global Movements and Local Historical Events: Itelmens of Kamchatka 
Appeal to the United Nations,” American Ethnologist 32, no. 4 (2005): 655.
66. T. Degai, “Indigenous Languages: Preservation and Revitalization: Articles 13, 14 and 
16 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” (2016), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/egm/Paper_Degai2.pdf.
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of institutions of self-governance (such as village councils) and helped 
to spread awareness about the difficulties Indigenous communities 
faced. At the same time, they did not constitute elements of a larger 
organized action, were short-lived and did not focus on instituting 
changes to their position in the state political system. 
ii) Struggle for Recognition: Indigenous Mobilizations in 
the Altai Republic and Karelia 
A more organized form of mobilization took place in urban 
areas. The leaders of these upheavals were professional politicians, 
intellectuals and scholars who worked at different levels and engaged 
communities in building institutions of Indigenous governance as parts 
of the state system. A number of these protests were struggles for the 
attainment of Indigenous status for the communities not included in the 
original list of 26 peoples in 1993.67 Among these were mobilizations 
of five Turkic communities residing in the Altai Republic and in the 
neighboring Altai Kray and Kemerovo Oblast’, namely the Telengit, 
the Teleut, the Kumandin, the Chelkan, and the Shor; and a struggle 
of a Finno-Ugric community, the Veps, residing in the Republic of 
Karelia and in Leningradskaya Oblast’. 
The struggle of the Turkic communities demonstrates how 
political privileges associated with status become obstacles to a larger 
organized political movement; it also shows that the attainment of 
status influences social conflicts and produces confusion in the ways 
people perceive their group identity. The specifics of the struggles 
of these communities are defined by the history of their relationship 
with the Altai people, a larger people historically considered an ethnos 
to which four of these communities (all but the Shor) belonged as 
sub-groups. During its initial stages, the struggle was combined in 
67. The year of 1993 marks the time of the adoption of the Russian Constitution, which 
confirmed the Indigenous status and rights of the original 26 “small peoples of the 
North.” Article 69 of the Constitution “guarantee[s] these communities the rights 
of the Indigenous peoples (i.e., korennie malochilsennie narodi) in accord with 
generally accepted international principles, the norms of the international law and the 
international treaties adapted by the Russian Federation.” See Russian Federation, 
Constitution of Russian Federation, (1993), http://www.constitution.ru/ 
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solidarity with the members of a larger Altai community; during later 
stages, it led to disunity, which intensified with these groups gaining 
the status of korennie malochislennie narodi in 2000. These events 
began with the late 1980s regional protests against the construction 
of the Katun’ hydroelectric power plant, which endangered ecological 
conditions and cultural practices of many communities living in the 
Altai Republic. The protests were successful: not only did they help to 
stop the construction, but they also unified members of different Altai 
groups, even those who were historically estranged.68 This early 1990s 
sense of unity among different communities across the Republic was 
also marked by the revival of traditional family structures as a part 
of an overall cultural revitalization of the Altai peoples. Among the 
communities historically residing in Altai, traditional extended family 
structures maintained their social role during the Soviet period, but only 
unofficially. During the transition period, these structures regained their 
significance in regulating relations among different communities (i.e., 
extended families, or seok in Altai). Representatives of different seoks 
began meeting at unified Soviet style conferences (in Russian, s’ezdi) 
to solve the problems of sustaining the economy, ecology and culture 
of their communities.69 The seoks’ leaders increasingly began turning 
to political means to defend the wellbeing of their lands, primarily by 
demanding that the local authorities respect the rights of communities 
to manage sacred sites and mountains. Some of these seoks initiated 
the creation of organizations to facilitate political mobilization for the 
Altai people.70 The recognition of the extended family as an institution 
of social organization among different Altai communities found its 
recognition in the republican legislature; and thus, is evidence of some 
success of seoks’-based mobilizations in Altai. 
68. Chemchieva, supra note 57, at 12. 
69. One of the primary goals of the seoks’ programs was revitalization of the ceremonies 
of respect for the forests, mountains or fauna considered sacred keepers of the 
family. See N. Tadina, “Ekologia i Kul’turnyiy Landshaft Altaya v Kontekste 
Mezjetnicheskoy Kommunikatsii,” [Russian: Экология и Культурный Ландшафт 
Алтая в Контексте Межэтнической Коммуникации.]  in The Izvestia of the Altai 
State University 3, no. 4 (2009): 211–2. 
70. E. Samushkina, Rodovoe Dvizjenie v Altae i Khakassii: Formirovanie Obrazov 
Proshlogo Regionov, [Russian: Родовое Движение в Алтае и Хакасии: 
Формирование Образов Прошлого Регионов.] Tartaria Magna 2 (2012): 156–7.
222 Ulia Gosart
In parallel to these activities, Indigenous leaders of particular 
communities, most prominently of the Teleut, the Tubalar, and the 
Chelkan, initiated campaigns in support of the needs of their specific 
communities, which had been historically marginalized economically 
and culturally within the larger Altai community. Since the 1990s, 
their leaders have demanded larger political representation for their 
communities, similar to the seoks’-based activism, as a part of a 
larger unified movement. These intentions defined the strategies the 
leaders used, the primary one being the formation of organizations 
and the creation of strategic alliances.71 The first republic-wide 
organization, Ene-Til, was created in Gorno-Altaisk in 1989 to 
include representatives of all Altai communities along with scholars, 
intellectuals and journalists.72 What unified the leaders at that 
moment was the goal of gaining autonomy for their territory, then 
existing as an oblast’ subordinated to the larger Altai Kray. When the 
region was officially recognized as a republic in 1992, the sense of 
solidarity dissipated as the leaders of different communities focused 
on advancing the political and economic positions of their particular 
communities against other groups residing in the region, primarily the 
Altai people. Thus, in 1992, the Northern groups—the Tubalar, the 
Chelkan and the Kumandin—formed the Association of the Northern 
Ethnos of the Altai as a way to strengthen their political presence in the 
region. This organization became the first legally registered entity in 
the region. While the changes in its goals and composition influenced 
some changes in its activities, it remained a body representing interests 
of more than one peoples.73 The leaders of some communities also 
united with representatives of their people living outside of the Altai 
71. Other examples include the Association of the Chelkan and the Association of the 
Tubalar formed in the 1990s. The members of these organizations also belonged to 
Ene-Til. The leaders lobbied local authorities for recognition of their communities 
in the status of a disappearing ethnic group; demanded means of protecting the 
lands and their communities used for cultural practices and traditional forms 
of subsistence; and requested financial support. One proposal demanded that 
industrial companies, working on community lands, support the communities by 
paying 5% of their revenues to the local Indigenous Peoples. See Chemchieva, 
supra note 57, at 23.
72. Chemchieva, supra note 57, at 15–6.
73. Ibid., 34, 43, 47.
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Republic. For example, the Teleut of the Altai collaborated with 
members of Ene-Bayat, a Teleut organization of the Kemerovskaya 
Oblast’. Similarly, the Altai-based members of the Kumandin and 
Shor communities worked in solidarity with political activists 
representing interests of their people living outside of the Altai.74 
The leaders appealed to international standards, particularly the ILO 
Convention 169, demanding recognition of the political and cultural 
rights of their communities. They even attempted to approach federal 
authorities: for example, in 1992, they wrote a letter to President Boris 
Yelt’sin.75 However, the key demands were cultural and language 
revival, economic and political opportunities for their communities, 
and better education for Indigenous children.76 In 1999, the republic 
government recognized the Tubalar and the Chelkan in the status of 
korennie malochislennie narodi, which in turn influenced recognition 
of these communities in this status at the federal level in 2000.77 The 
Shor, the Kumandin and the Teleut also gained the status in 2000, the 
moment that marked the conclusion to their initial political project. 
The attainment of this status resulted in little substantive change to 
the situations of Altai Indigenous communities. Scholars report a loss 
of political aspirations among Indigenous activists, and a pervasive 
lack of trust among Indigenous men and women toward the authorities 
administering Indigenous issues and the instruments designed to support 
Indigenous wellbeing, as well as toward organizations that came to 
represent Indigenous interests in the post-Soviet Altai.78 Gaining the 
status also intensified disunity among the population of Altai. Many 
individuals of Altai nationality feel disfranchised, since they frequently 
face conditions similar to those of Indigenous men and women, yet 
are unable to enjoy the benefits associated with the Indigenous status.79 
Further, formal separation of the communities with the status of korennie 
malochislennie narodi from the Altai people affected demographics of 
74. Ibid., 20–1.
75. Ibid., 26–7.
76. Ibid., 82, 94.
77. Ibid., 39–40.
78. Ibid., 123. Indigenous organizations remain a part of the Altai political landscape 
today, primarily focusing on the ecological rights of Indigenous groups.
79. Ibid., 189–193.
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the Altai, which in turn may have political implications endangering 
the status of Altai as a republic. This factor further increased a sense of 
hostility among some Altai persons toward their Indigenous neighbors.80 
Indigenous persons, in turn, experience a pronounced sense of dual 
identity. While they remain members of the polity of the Altai Republic, 
they feel alienated from the larger Altai community since they remain 
unable to govern their own communities autonomously from the Altai 
authorities. Thus, attaining status for the Altai communities resulted in 
an increase in the social vulnerability of these peoples. 
The Veps, in contrast with the Altai communities, formally existed as 
a separate people since the creation of the Soviet Union, and even had 
their own national territory from 1927 until 1956. Since 1956, the Veps 
remained under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Karelia with two other 
main peoples living in the republic: the Karelian and the Indigenous 
Saami.81 The Veps gained the status of korennie malochislennie narodi 
(KMN) in 2000, and the status of KMN living in the areas of the North, 
Siberia and the Far East in 2006. While the Veps, similar to the Altai 
activists, formed organizations as the key means to lobby for their 
status, their recognition as KMN was primarily the result of the work of 
one establishment: the Society of Vepsian Culture (Obschestvo Vepskoy 
Kul’turi), which engaged international instruments supporting Indigenous 
rights to buttress its political campaign. The Society was formed in 1989 
with the primary goal of maintaining and reviving Veps culture and 
language. In 1994, a founder of the Society and its prominent leader, a 
Veps scholar named Zinaida Strogalschikova, became a deputy to the 
first convocation of the Karelia Legislative Assembly (Zakonodatel’noe 
Sobranie), which formulated the instruments of self-governance of the 
post-Soviet Karelia.82 In 2002, she represented Russian Indigenous 
communities as a member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on 
80. Ibid., 179–182.
81. A. Varfolomeeva, Evolution of the Concept “Indigenous People” in the Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federation: the Case Study of Vepses, Master’s Thesis 
(Budapest, Hungary: Central European University, 2012), 56–8.
82. Zakonodatel’noe Sobranie, “Zakonodatel’noe Sobranie Respubliki Karelia 
Piati Sozivov,” [Russian: Законодательное Собрание Республики Карелия 
Пяти Созывов] (2014), http://www.karelia-zs.ru/o_zakonodatelnom_sobranii/
istoricheskaya_spravka/20_let_zakonodatelnomu_sobraniyu_respubliki_kareliya/
zakonodatelnoe_sobranie_respubliki_kareliya_pyati_sozyvov/. 
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Indigenous Issues.83 The prominent position of Strogalschikova and her 
knowledge of international principles supporting Indigenous rights led 
her to engage the international community in support of the Veps’ case 
as a way to attain status for her people. In the early 1990s, she lobbied 
the government of Karelia for the right of her organization to represent 
the Veps at the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). In 1997, Strogalschikova represented 
the Veps at the Working Group, where her participation in the work 
of the BEAC signified that the BEAC members recognized the Veps 
as Indigenous peoples. Strogalschikova observes that this recognition 
was an important factor influencing the Karelia and federal authorities 
to recognize the Veps as korennie malochislennie narodi. The members 
of the Society continued to collaborate with the BEAC, and applied for 
international grants in the 1990s. Since 2005, the Society has also been 
supported by funds provided by the authorities of the republic and the 
Saami Parliament of Norway.84 
The degree to which attaining this status changed the economic, 
social and political situation of the Veps communities remains a 
subject of further research. Current findings provide a rather bleak 
picture of the economic situation facing these communities (see part 
III of this chapter for details). At the same time, this case suggests that 
collaboration between the Veps and international Indigenous rights 
bodies might have strengthened the political positioning of the Veps 
activists at the republican and even federal governing bodies. This 
collaboration may gain prominence in the future, given the significance 
of the Arctic in the global economy, and the relatively prominent 
position of Indigenous politicians in the governance of the Arctic.85 
83. Ibid., 58–59.
84. Z. Strogalschikova, Korennie Narodi Barents-Regiona: Saami Rossii, Norvegii, 
Shvetsii, Finliyandii, Nentsi i Vepsi Proveli 9–10 Fevralia v g. Kirkenese Svoy II 
S’ezd., [Russian: Коренные Народы Баренц-Региона: Cаами России, Норвегии, 
Швеции, Финляндии, Ненцы и Вепсы Провели 9–10 Февраля в г. Киркенесе 
Свой II Съезд] (2012), www.petrozavodsk-mo.ru/html/upload/kornarBarents.rtf. 
85. The history of Indigenous activism at the Arctic Council is particularly promising. 
The Council, created in 1996, is a body supporting cooperation of the Arctic 
states: the United States of America, Canada, the Russian Federation and the five 
Nordic states, regarding the development of the Arctic. See Arctic Council, Ottawa 
Declaration: Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, (1996). The 
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As these cases demonstrate, political mobilizations among 
communities whose leaders focused on gaining the status of korennie 
malochislennie narodi for their people were more organized and 
sustained in comparison with rural protests. While in some cases these 
struggles might have resulted in creating greater economic and social 
opportunities for the members of these communities, their outcomes did 
not substantively change the political positions of Indigenous leaders 
at the levels of regional and federal governance. Nor did they compose 
elements of struggle at the all-state level, while—as the case of the 
Altai communities suggests—the instances of mobilizations among 
Indigenous politicians living in different territorial administrative 
units took place for as long as their participants were unified by a 
similar set of interests and goals, but were short-lived and focused on 
the aims of immediate significance to the participants. 
iii) Okrug-Level Struggles: The Case of KMAO
The struggles at the level of okrugs remain by far the most 
prominent and sustained form of Indigenous mobilizations. In the 
okrugs, activists looked for opportunities to join the governments of 
the subjects where they lived; created professional organizations to 
represent Indigenous interests to the local and federal governments; 
and worked with international human rights activists and scholars. 
Such form of struggle was particularly prominent among leaders of 
the communities of the original 26 peoples. A case of activism of the 
Khant and the Mansi from Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (herein 
KMAO) is particularly demonstrative here, while it is also exceptional. 
The KMAO government was the first to pass regulations supporting 
Indigenous rights to lands in 1992, surpassing similar developments 
at the federal level. The government was also among the most active 
in resisting federal limitations of Indigenous rights in the early 2000s. 
The KMAO Assembly of Representatives of Indigenous Peoples, 
role of Indigenous politicians at this forum evolved from the status of observers 
to permanent participants. It guarantees them the right to veto a specific proposal 
should they reject it. See T. Koivurova and L. Heinam¨ak, “The Participation of 
Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic,” Polar Record 
42, no. 2 (2006). 
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created in 1996 as a part of the KMAO Duma (Parliament), remains 
the body responsible for drafting legislation in support of Indigenous 
rights. In comparison to similar entities created by politicians in the 
other okrugs, the KMAO Assembly enjoys a greater degree of political 
power: it convenes separately from the Duma and the Chairman of the 
Assembly, elected by the members of the Assembly, simultaneously 
serves as one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Duma.86 The KMAO 
politicians also instituted a quota system allocating initially six seats 
out of 23 total seats at the Duma to deputies representing the interests of 
Indigenous communities. While similar provisions also functioned in 
other okrugs, most prominently in Nenets Autonomous Okrug (herein 
NAO) and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO), only in the 
KMAO had the provision lasted until 2015. In other okrugs, it was 
annulled in 2008 (NAO) and in 2009 (YNAO). Finally, the government 
has also been supporting Indigenous communities primarily from the 
okrug budget, with little support from federal subsidies.87
The two crucial factors that shaped political activities of KMAO 
activists are the history of Indigenous activism in the okrug, and the 
location of oil industries in KMAO. Since KMAO was created in 
1930 as a homeland territory for the Indigenous Khant and Mansi, 
Indigenous resistance in the okrug was, while sporadic and for the 
most part unsuccessful, ongoing.88 The oil development that began in 
86. P. Panov, “Instituti i Praktiki Spetsial’nogo Predstavitel’stva Narodov Severa v 
Regional’nikh Parlamentakh,” [Russian: Институты и Практики Специального 
Представительства Народов Севера в Региональных Парламентах] Power 10 
(2013): 56. 
87. For example, from 2011 to 2014, the KMAO government provided about 138 
million rubles in grants whereas the federal share was only 1.3 million rubles. 
See Government of Khanty-Mansi Okrug, “Itogi Realisatsii 1 Etapa Kontseptsii 
Ustoichivogo Razvitiya Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov Severa KMAO – 
Ugri,” [Russian: Итоги Реализации 1 Этапа Концепции Устойчивого Развития 
Коренных Малочисленных Народов Севера ХМАО-Югры] (2015) http://www.
kmns.admhmao.ru/upload/iblock/621/itogi_kontseptsiya_ur_kmns_1_etap_svod.pdf.
88. The Kazim war (1931–1934) is the most well known and most well organized 
struggle led by joint forces, primarily the Khant and the Nenets. For the chronology 
of these struggles and analysis, see respectively: S. Piskunov, Kazimskie Vosstaniya 
1931–1934 gg., [Russian: Казымские Восстания 1931 - 1934 гг.] (2004), http://
www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1931sssr.html and A. Leete, “The Role of Young people 
in Resistance Against the Soviet Rule Among the Northern Peoples in the 
1930s–1940s,” Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore 41 (2009). Other groups 
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the 1960s left many communities landless, leading Indigenous rights 
struggles to take the form of ecological resistance. Intellectuals and 
scholars supported the Indigenous cause, protesting against ecological 
degradation in the region. During the late 1980s, the protests against 
industrial developments in the area were numerous. Some took 
the form of blocking railroads, pipelines or roads projects near or 
leading to the sites of industrial development. Others, in urban areas, 
targeted local administrations. Among the most well known were 
“chum” protests, where activists used a chum, a tent of animal skins 
representing a traditional Indigenous house, to symbolically bring 
Indigenous voices into these protests. A famous 1990 protest took 
place in the Varyogansk area. The activists used a chum to block the 
rail and road construction leading to Yamal, a key area of the energy 
complexes. Organized by Yuri Vella, a Nenets writer, and supported 
by known Indigenous politicians including Evdokiya Gaer, it received 
statewide news coverage, bringing attention to the consequences of 
ecological degradation for Indigenous communities. A similar protest 
took place in 1993 in the Nizjnevartovsk area, where oil developments 
led to severe ecological damage to the Russkinskie community lands. 
Activists blocked the traffic with a chum, placed on the bridge over 
the Tromuygan River. The protest was supported by the oil company 
drivers, and helped to bring about compensation to Indigenous and non-
Indigenous inhabitants of the affected community. An urban site chum 
picket took place in 1993 in the KMAO capital of Khanti-Mansiysk, 
organized by members of the organization Spasenie Ugri (Association 
for the Salvation of the Ugra). The activists placed a chum in front 
of the KMAO Duma, demanding recognition of their rights to lands 
and political representation in the KMAO government.89 While these 
protests were helpful in raising awareness of Indigenous problems 
though the media, as a rule, they brought little substantive change to 
communities. 
also resisted during the early periods of the Soviet regime; for example, a number 
of uprisings among the Yamal Nenets, mandaladas, took place in the 1930s. See, 
for example, A. Golovnev, and G. Osherenko. Siberian Survival: The Nenets and 
Their Story (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 82–88. 
89. M. Balzer, The Tenacity of Ethnicity: A Siberian Saga in Global Perspective, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 150.
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During the next stage, Indigenous activists turned to the 
development of legal instruments as the main strategy to ensure 
their rights. Some of these endeavors originated at the community 
level and were later supported by Indigenous deputies in the KMAO 
government. The history of creating the instruments on the protection 
of Indigenous rights to land, which—by their scope and proposed 
means of protection—were unprecedented at the time, provides a 
relevant example here.90 This work began with the Council of Elders 
of Ugut village (in the southern part of KMAO). The Council was 
formed in 1989 to resist industrial developments on a nearby site. 
Its members, having little success with approaching regional and 
federal officials, drafted an instrument on a “green zone” that would 
help protect community lands by legal means. The Council members 
approached officials of the Tyumen Oblast, then a governing body of 
KMAO, with no success. The activists turned to the Khant delegates 
at KMAO Okrug Council of People's Deputies next. The delegates 
helped develop their proposal into two laws and saw them adapted 
in 1992.91 The reasons why the KMAO government adapted these 
instruments demands further research. The move might have been to 
ensure support of Indigenous voters during a moment of transition 
and political unrest. It may also have been meant to demonstrate to 
their host region, Tyumen Oblast, KMAO’s determination and ability 
to self-govern, given that the KMAO leaders were struggling to gain 
autonomy from the Oblast’. In 1994, these laws would be nullified 
but, by then, KMAO had gained its autonomy from Tyumen. Despite 
this disappointing beginning, in 1996, the KMAO government 
created the Assembly of Representatives of Indigenous Peoples. 
This Assembly was, as a part of the Duma, initially composed of 
90. These instruments were the “Polozheniye o Statuse Rodovykh Ugodiyv Khanty-
Mansiyskom Avtonomnom Okruge” [Regulation Concerning the Status of Kinship 
Communities in KMAO], and “O Mekhanisme Vnedreniya Polozheniya o Statuse 
Rodovykh Ugodii v Khanty-Mansiyskom Avtonomnom Okruge” [Concerning 
the Mechanism for Applying the Regulation Concerning the Status of Kinship 
Communities in KMAO]. 
91. A. Wiget, and O. Balalaeva, “National Communities, Native Land Tenure, and 
Self-Determination Among the Eastern Khanty,” Polar Geography 21, no. 1 
(1997): 19, 21.
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five deputies, elected by single-mandate electoral districts.92 The 
Assembly adopted a number of regulations to advance Indigenous 
rights to lands, resources, and culture.93 In response to the changes 
at the federal level instituted by President Putin’s administration, the 
Assembly developed 40 acts supporting Indigenous rights to land 
from 2001 to 2006. Today, however, Indigenous participation in the 
okrug government is primarily a matter of consultation. 
Given that overall, KMAO governing officials were reluctant to 
advance Indigenous causes,94 which factors might have influenced these 
changes? One may surmise that the move was a united response by 
both the Assembly members and members of the okrug government to 
withstand measures of centralizing federal rule, particularly regarding 
distribution of revenues from oil and gas developments. In fact, 
the KMAO government had aligned with the industrialists.95 These 
alliances might have been beneficial since they allowed governing 
officials to become intermediaries between industries and Indigenous 
communities, and thus benefit to some degree from the industrial work 
on Indigenous lands. This supposition is also supported by scholarly 
reports on the changes in the position of industrial companies in 
the area. In the 1990s, these companies expressed little interest in 
92. The provision did not stipulate that deputies elected in this district must be 
Indigenous. In fact, in 2001, two deputies were Indigenous, and one was Russian. 
At the same time, the right to choose deputies was given to organizations and, 
since 2000, to the KMAO Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the North to ensure 
that elected deputies would indeed represent interests of communities. See Panov, 
supra note 86, at 56. The KMAO Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the North, 
a gathering that by form and function resembled Soviet type party conferences, 
became primarily a gathering where candidates to this position would be elected. 
See V. Kryazhkov, “The Example of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug,” in An 
Indigenous Parliament? Realities and Perspectives in Russia and the Circumpolar 
North no. 116, K. Wessendorf ed. (2005): 68–73. From 2001 to 2011, the number 
would drop to three deputies. 
93. For a list of these laws and detailed discussion of the work of the Assembly, 
consult Ekspertnoe Mnenie, “Politicheskaya Istoriya Korennikh Malochislennikh 
Narodov Severa Popolnyayetsya Novimi Stranitsami,” [Russian: Политическая 
История Коренных Малочисленных Народов Севера Пополняется Новыми 
Страницами] (2016), http://expert.or86.ru/articles/view/12
94. Ibid. 
95. G. Wilson, “Abandoning the Nest: Regional Mergers and their Impact on the 
Russian North,” Polar Geography, 27 no. 3 (2003): 248.
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negotiating compensation with Indigenous communities.96 In the 
2000s, many companies set up foundations to support Indigenous 
communities and created departments to negotiate cooperative 
agreements with organizations that represented Indigenous rights 
in KMAO.97 Attending to Indigenous rights at different moments of 
the post-Soviet history of KMAO, thus, might have been a strategy 
for the KMAO governing officials to secure the legitimacy of their 
own interests. When the interests of the governing officials no longer 
aligned with Indigenous causes, their interest in supporting them 
diminished, as the recent history of the Assembly suggests.98 
In addition to working at the level of the government, KMAO 
advocates, similar to the Altai and Veps activists, created public 
organizations as a means of representing Indigenous interests. The 
leading and the oldest organization in the region is still Spasenie Ugri, 
formed in 1989 by seven women.99 Members of these organizations 
worked in conjunction with Indigenous politicians at the level of the 
government, and also joined the government.100 They have lobbied 
the okrug authorities on three key issues: ecological concerns 
and wellbeing of Indigenous communities; relationships between 
communities and industrial companies; and political representation of 
Indigenous Peoples in the administrative structures of the okrug.101 
Spasenie Ugri, which grew to become an umbrella entity for the 
okrug with a number of branches functioning in different parts of 
the okrug, is among the key organizations working with the KMAO 
96. Wiget and Balalaeva, supra note 91, at 24–25. 
97. Alferova, supra note 26, at 155.
98. Most of the Assembly’s legislative proposals to the Duma have been rejected. 
See Duma Khanti-Mansiyskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga – Ugri, Perechen’ 
Zakonodatelnikh Initsiativ, [Russian: Перечень Законодательных Инициатив] 
(n/d), http://www.dumahmao.ru/assemblyoftherepresentativesofthenorth/initiatives/
99. Balzer, supra note 89, at 149.
100. Tatiana Gogoleva, the president of the organization from 1989 to 1997, joined 
the KMAO government in 1990. Current president of the organization Aleksandr 
Nov’ukhov is also a member of the KMAO government. See Duma Khanti-
Mansiyskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga – Ugri, Sostav Assamblei, [Russian: Состав 
Ассамблеи] (n/d), http://www.dumahmao.ru/assemblyoftherepresentativesofthen
orth/sostavAssamb/.
101. G. Wilson, “‘Matryoshka Federalism’ and the Case of the Khanty Mansiysk 
Autonomous Okrug,” Post-Soviet Affairs 17, no. 2 (2001): 175.
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government.102 The work of professional Indigenous politicians with 
access to federal and international institutions dealing with Indigenous 
issues was likewise a supporting factor.103 
The history of Indigenous activism in KMAO suggests that the 
ability of Indigenous politicians to make strategic alliances with 
government officials and maneuver interests of government officers 
and industrial companies, has been vital in supporting the success 
of some of their campaigns. Knowledge of international Indigenous 
rights norms was also significant, given that in the 1990s and early 
2000s, Indigenous rights legislature was drafted in Russia,104 and 
much collaboration occurred between activists and scholars from 
outside of the okrug. While similar activities have taken place in 
other subjects of Russia,105 it would be difficult to characterize these 
102. Spasenie Ugri, Deyatel’nost’ Оbshchestvennoy Organizatsii Spasenie Ugri, 
[Russian: Деятельность Oбщественной Oрганизации Спасение Югры] (2015), 
http://spasenie_ugry.ucitizen.ru/financial/
103. For example, Yeremey Aipin, a well-known Khant politician from KMAO, was 
working at the federal level in the 1990s on regulations protecting Indigenous 
rights prior to joining the KMAO Assembly in 2001. Aipin might have influenced 
developments at the okrug level by appealing not only to federal officials, but also 
to international partners.
104. Evidence suggests that Indigenous activists worked with international scholars and 
human rights advocates.
For example, in 2000, KMAO activists approached Andrew Wiget and Ol’ga 
Balalaeva, who were scholars working in the region, asking for help in drafting a 
law to protect folklore that would comply with international standards. The move 
resulted in the creation of the KMAO Law No. 37–03, “On the Folklore of the 
Native Minority Peoples of the North Living on the Territory of Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug,” which went into effect on June 18, 2003. See B. Donahoe, 
“The Law as a Source of Environmental Injustice in the Russian Federation,” 
in Environmental Justice and Sustainability in the Former Soviet Union, J. 
Agyeman, and Y. Ogneva-Himmelberger eds. (Cambridge, United States of 
America: MIT Press, 2009), 37.
105. In the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the new government also fought successfully 
to secede from their host region, the Magadan Oblast, as a way to manage their 
affairs with a greater degree of autonomy. Indigenous politicians in this okrug had 
to lobby non-Indigenous post-Soviet administrative officials who were “hostile” 
to the Indigenous cause. See P. Gray, “Chukotka's Indigenous Intellectuals and 
Subversion of Indigenous Activism in the 1990s,” Études/Inuit/Studies 31, no. 1/2 
(2007): 152. Today, professional politicians affiliated with RAIPON seem to lead 
activism in Chukotka. Similarly to Spasenie Ugri, the organization coordinates 
traditional economic activities of Indigenous communities in Chukotka and the 
work of smaller Indigenous organizations in the okrug. See Assotsiatsia Korennikh 
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mobilizations as elements of a unified all-state action. As the KMAO 
case suggests, the particularities of the groups’ location within the 
administrative system of the transitioning Russian state significantly 
shaped the political wants and interests of Indigenous politicians. Many 
politicians aimed to gain access to political and economic resources; 
their wants precluded their mobilizations from gaining the character 
of an organized action which would spread outside of the okrug’s 
boundaries, despite the fact that collaboration among politicians from 
different administrative units of Russia did take place. These factors 
also help explain the transformation of Indigenous mobilizations of 
the 1990s into professional activism in Russia, which remains the 
main form of Indigenous advocacy today.
b) Development of Professional Activism
The moment of transition of the Russian state also marks the rise 
of Indigenous professional activism. Two main forms of professional 
advocacy developed in post-Soviet Russia: professional politics, 
characterized by the top-down activism approach, where mobilization 
took place at different levels of the government; and advocacy by 
means of creating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which 
existed through funds other than membership fees, becoming a form 
of vocation for their leaders.
The professional work of activists on the levels of the federal and 
regional governments became possible due to already existing Soviet 
Malochislennikh Narodov Severa, Assotsiatsii Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov 
Chukotki Ispolnilos’ 25 Let, [Russian: Ассоциации Коренных Малочисленных 
Народов Чукотки Исполнилось 25 Лет] (2015), http://www.raipon.info/info/
news/934/?sphrase_id=747188. The case of Indigenous rights in Sakha is also 
informative. It demonstrates how Indigenous politicians, located in the subjects of 
other nationalities—especially within the republics—worked with the regional (non-
Indigenous) governments to ensure that new leaders would consider protection of 
Indigenous rights while developing new laws and means of governance. In Sakha, 
as might have been in KMAO, the leaders of the republic addressed Indigenous 
legislation as a way to demonstrate to the federal government their ability to self-
govern, and thus ensure a degree of autonomy from Moscow. See Fondahl, Lazebnik, 
and Poelzer, supra note 15. Furthermore, see the work of Andrey Krivoshapkin, a 
politician who worked at the federal level during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, 
who might have influenced the relative success of the Indigenous campaign in Sakha.
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institutions supporting ethnic minority politics. The Soviet minority 
officials—often appointed by the party, and necessarily being members 
of the party—functioned as key components in controlling the political 
life of their communities, and as keepers of peace in the state during 
the Soviet era. Ironically, many of these officials became leaders of 
nationalist movements during the transition; the fact that they had 
exclusive access to political resources explains their prominence 
during the early period of self-determination campaigns.106 A number 
of Indigenous politicians who would participate in drafting Indigenous 
legislation came from the Soviet system of state administration, 
including officials working at the federal level of government.107 These 
leaders extended Soviet instruments of political organizing to support 
their activities in the environments of the new state. For example, not 
accidently, the event marking the beginning of professional advocacy 
in Russia was an all-state Indigenous conference in Moscow (March 
1990) organized by Indigenous intellectuals in conjunction with 
the Soviet government. While it was attended by high-level federal 
officials, including Michael Gorbachev, the key decision of the 
conference was the establishment of an Indigenous-led organization 
that would regulate the development of Indigenous issues. Thus was 
formed the Association of Small Peoples of the North (Assotsiatsiia 
Malochislennykh Narodov Severa), which would later become the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). 
First presided over by Vladimir Sangi, a Nivh writer, RAIPON would 
grow to become the leading organization defending Indigenous rights 
in Russia.108 This same year, Sangi and Evdodokia Gaer, an established 
106. P. Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics 43, no. 2 
(1991).
107. Eremei Aipin, Ne Pogasnet Ochag, [Russian: Не Погаснет Очаг] (2016), http://
nasevere-life.ru/kachestvo-zhizni/135-eremej-ajpin-ne-pogasnet-ochag
108. Another key outcome of this conference was the creation of Goskomsever (the 
State Committee for the North of Russia), which coordinated Indigenous issues 
on the federal level until 2000, when it was annulled. The next significant event 
was a May 1991 s’ezd of deputies representing Indigenous communities, with 
more than 100 deputies attending. Among key outcomes of this conference was 
the creation of the Assembly of the Deputies of the Small-Numbered Peoples 
of the North (Deputatskaya Assambleya Malochislennykh Narodov Severa). 
Envisioned as a parliament for Indigenous politicians, with Eremei Aipin chosen 
as its first chairman, this body primarily dissimilated international norms regarding 
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Soviet politician of Nanai nationality, represented Russia at the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Issues in Geneva for the first time.109 
These Indigenous politicians relied on their Soviet-style training and 
experience to conduct their campaigns and to work with government 
officials to create Indigenous rights laws, and/or institute change to 
existing provisions. For example, the means of political organizing 
that Indigenous professional politicians chose were strikingly similar 
to those supporting the functioning of Soviet political institutions. The 
main form of the high-level Indigenous political conference became 
s’ezd, which by its function and meaning was an evolved form of a 
Soviet party conference. Similarly to the Soviet s’ezd, the Indigenous 
s’ezd became the highest decision-making body, where delegates, 
officially elected to represent their communities, made decisions and 
elected representatives to political structures and/or organizations. 
With RAIPON growing into a leading body that would coordinate 
legal and political developments of Indigenous rights in Russia, all-
state Indigenous s’ezds would be organized under RAIPON auspices 
once every four years. The latest conference, VIII s’ezd, took place 
in March 2017 in Yamal. In parallel with these all-state events, there 
emerged congresses and conferences organized at the level of the 
subjects of the Russian federation, and/or by major Indigenous rights 
organizations, functioning similarly to the all-state Indigenous s’ezd. 
These events brought together representatives of diverse communities, 
often belonging to one ethno-linguistic group, as well as Indigenous 
politicians, scholars, and administrative officials.110 Another form of 
human and Indigenous rights and published regional legislature and documents 
of organizations of Indigenous peoples until 1995, when it was closed. See Z. 
Strogalschikova, “Korennie Malochislennie Narodi Rossii v Politike Gosudarstva: 
Formirovanie Zakonodatel’stva i ego Realizatsiya v Postsovetskiy Period,” 
[Russian: Коренные Малочисленные Народы России в Политике Государства: 
Формирование Законодательства и его Реализация в Постсоветский 
Период] Finno-Ugric World, 1 (2008): 50.
109. Strogalschikova, supra note 108, at 50.
110. Thus, members of Finno-Ugric communities (regardless of their status) organized 
into an Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples of Russia. Since the 1990s, they 
have convened by means of both s’ezdi and congresses, with congresses since 
1994 taking on an international character given that members of some Finno-
Ugric communities come from outside of Russia (Saami and Hungarians). See V. 
Tishkov, Pravovoy Status Finno-Ugorskikh Yazikov I Etnokulturnie Poterbnosti 
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gathering has been congresses, which, while also functioning as a 
means for Indigenous scholars and politicians to convene, operated and 
continue to operate as forums that sometimes have an international scope. 
In many ways, Indigenous politicians’ choice of political tools 
and ability to employ institutions of state governance for their 
needs manifests their adaptation to realities of a new state, which in 
turn was adapted from the Soviet system of governance to prevent 
the fragmentation of Russia during the time of transition.111 The 
prominence of professional Indigenous politicians in fostering change 
also signifies that forms of traditional leadership within communities 
have lost their significance as instruments of community governance, 
which in part resulted from the seventy years of Soviet rule.112 
What emerged was a relatively new form of politics within post-
Soviet Russia: NGO-based activism, where the functioning of the NGO 
depended on transnational and domestic resources. Not all Indigenous 
organizations that emerged in the 1990s were strictly means for their 
leaders to advance the interests of their communities while also 
advancing their professional careers. A large number of organizations 
that evolved from Soviet public organizations functioned on a 
volunteer basis, and as a means to support social ties among community 
members. What is significant for this study is that a number of NGO 
Rossiyskoy Shkoli, [Russian: Правовой Статус Финно-Угорских Языков и 
Этнокультурные Потребности Российской Школы] (2011), 70–5; 92–4. 
111. Smith, supra note 21, at 391. 
112. The Soviet system of centralized governance and the territorial-administrative 
division of the new state did not correspond and, at times, contradicted local 
Indigenous systems and means of governance. See Vakhtin, supra note 59, 
at 24–27. It introduced new ways of managing community issues and stripped 
many traditional leaders (especially the shamans) of their powers. While in many 
communities, particularly remote ones, traditional structures of governance were 
partly retained, traditional leadership increasingly could not manage economic 
development, forced resettlement of their people (especially in the 1950–1960s), 
and migration of other persons to their historical homelands. For example, in 
the 1960s, more than 40 Shor settlements were abandoned as a response to the 
forced resettlement projects by the federal government of the Russian Republic. 
The Shor’s economic enterprises were recognized as unprofitable and were closed 
with many people losing their jobs; the state-supported housing projects in rural 
areas were also stopped, leading the Shor to move to urban areas to survive. See 
Vakhtin, supra note 59, at 53. With the Soviet system developing, many Indigenous 
communities fell into dependency on local and regional administrations.
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leaders simultaneously participated in the state political institutions. In 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrugs, for example, NGOs became the key legal entities to propose 
Indigenous candidates for the regional government.113 Thus, these 
organizations became instruments to voice Indigenous concerns within 
a larger polity of the Russian state, yet outside of the official institutions 
of state governance (i.e., by providing Indigenous politicians with 
an alternative means to conduct their campaigns, at times engaging 
with international partners). Activities of these organizations differed 
depending on the expertise of the leaders: some focused on culture 
and language revival (which seems to be a particularly prominent 
area among NGOs of Finno-Ugric communities); many—as is 
particularly visible in the case of Altai organizations—lobbied against 
environmental degradation; and many helped rural dwellers appeal 
to local and regional administrators regarding injustices committed 
against them.114 Some organizations, like LIENIP, used the means 
of legal education to help communities resist the abuse of rights on 
regional and local levels by creating educational events and materials 
which explained laws to the local communities and assisted in 
appealing their cases to the regional and federal administrations. Some 
activists, most visibly members of RAIPON, also represented the 
Russian Indigenous cause at international fora on Indigenous rights, 
primarily at the United Nations. What ensured the success of these 
organizations, as research on this subject matter suggests, is the ability 
of their leaders to determine how to gain funding and allies; and, 
especially during the past decade, their skills, power and willingness 
to respond to the changes in the political climate of the state, given 
the adoption of measures that severely restricted the activities of non-
state actors since 2011.115 Today, the major NGOs in Russia are funded 
113. Ivanchenko, Kinev, and Lubarev, supra note 41.
114. Rohr, supra note 25, at 24.
115. Among several provisions adopted on the federal level in this area, the most drastic 
measures include the 2011–2012 revisions to the Federal Act “On Non-Profit 
Organizations” which now requires NGOs accepting grants from international 
institutions to register as “foreign agents” if they are involved in political activities. 
Since then, the government has been conducting campaigns of checks and audits, 
leading many NGOs to stop functioning or to limit their activities. See Rohr, supra 
note 25, at 34–35. 
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by regional governments and/or industrial companies (especially if 
an organization functions as a liaison between industries, government 
and communities as, for example, with Spasenie Ugri; and/or they 
function in partnership with research and cultural establishments as, 
for example, does the Society of Veps Culture). 
Despite a rather promising beginning of professional activism in 
Russia, since the mid-1990s, Indigenous politicians began losing their 
political privileges at the federal and regional levels. The number 
of Indigenous representatives working with federal and regional 
authorities went down. In the Duma of 1994–1996, there were only 
three deputy representatives of KMN; from 1996–2000, there were 
two; from 2000–2004, there was one; and in 2008, there were no 
representatives working as deputies on the federal level.116 The number 
of Indigenous deputies was also decreasing at the regional levels as 
was, for example, visible at the level of autonomous okrugs where 
the quota systems ensuring Indigenous political participation were 
abolished. Gradually, the role of Indigenous politicians in Russian 
politics transformed into that of consultants to authorities with little 
power to influence law making or to make decisions regarding their 
communities. Today, the involvement of Indigenous politicians in the 
management of Indigenous issues is conducted primarily by means 
of advisory bodies, or councils on both federal and regional levels. 
The two Advisory Councils on the Issues of Small Indigenous Peoples 
of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation 
were established in the Siberian federal okrug of Russia (2002), 
and recently in the Northwestern Federal Okrug (2013).117 These 
Councils are consultative bodies that coordinate the work of regional 
Indigenous organizations and their relationships with regional and 
federal authorities. The work of each council is overseen by a polpred, 
or presidential envoy, who is nominated by the president to administer 
the work of an okrug. The other members of the council include 
presidents of regional Indigenous organizations, scholars, members 
of the executive branches of the government, and federal inspectors to 
116. Strogalschikova, supra note 108, at 50–1. 
117. This date is estimated, given that the Council convenes twice a year, with the third 
meeting taking place in May, 2014. 
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the region. The Council of the Siberian okrug, for example, consists of 
37 members, with 16 leaders from regional Indigenous organizations 
among whom two hold positions as deputies. Of the rest of the members, 
nine are scholars, and the others are representatives of government 
authorities. The Council of the Northwestern okrug consists of 23 
members with 11 leaders of regional organizations, many of whom are 
also scholars and professionals in the area of Indigenous cultures, with 
the rest being members of the government.118 The current President of 
RAIPON, Grigorii Ledkov, is a federal deputy and a member of both 
Councils, yet was appointed by the president (versus being elected by 
Indigenous politicians). While the Siberian Council provides expert 
advice to the authorities, many recommendations, particularly those 
related to the political opportunities of Indigenous communities, 
remain unaddressed by regional authorities.119 Similar expert bodies 
have also been created at the level of the subjects. In KMAO, for 
example, a recently created body to handle Indigenous affairs—the 
Council of the Representatives of Indigenous People of KMAO at 
the Government—supports Indigenous political participation by 
inviting members of Indigenous organizations to discuss means of 
regulating Indigenous communities with municipal administrations 
and higher-level government officials. The Council is headed by a 
Vice-Chair of the KMAO, a governor responsible for internal affairs 
with no legislative powers.120 Similar bodies were also created in the 
Altai Republic in 2014, and in Sakha in 2012. The power of creating 
laws—a power that KMAO Indigenous politicians used to have—has 
now been replaced by Indigenous politicians’ roles as experts, advisors 
118. See, respectively, Ekspertno-Konsultativnii Soviet po Delam Korennikh 
Malochislennikh Narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka, Sostav, [Russian: 
Состав] (n/d), http://sfo.gov.ru/polpred/orgs/sovet7/sostav/; and Konsul’tativnii 
Soviet Severo-Zapadnogo Federal’nogo Okruga po Voprosam Korennikh Narodov, 
Sostav Konsultativnogo Soveta, [Russian: Состав Консультативного Совета] 
(2015) http://szfo.gov.ru/sovet/sovet_narod/. 
119. Chemchieva, supra note 57, at 151.
120. Government of Khanty-Mansi Okrug, “Postanovlenie o Soviete Predstaviteley 
Korennikh Malochslennikh Narodov Severa Khanty-Mansiyskogo Okruga – Ugri 
pri Pravitel’stve,” [Russian: Постановление о Совете Представителей Коренных 
Малочисленных Народов Севера Ханты-Мансийского Округа – Югры при 
Правительстве] (2016), http://kmns.admhmao.ru/upload/iblock/1e0/149_p.pdf
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or liaisons between communities, administrators and, in some parts, 
industrial companies.
Thus, post-Soviet Indigenous professional advocacy evolved 
from Soviet political institutions. Given the difficulties Indigenous 
professional activists faced, the most they were able to gain—
especially during the early stages of activism—was compensation 
to overcome political and cultural marginalization within the state 
system. This took the form, primarily, of political opportunities for 
Indigenous leadership mostly at the local and regional (i.e., subject) 
levels. Frequent dependency of Indigenous leaders on the interests 
of the authorities and/or donors, as well as competition for funds, 
contributed to the lack of solidarity among Indigenous politicians. 
Furthermore, their work was often separated from political upheavals 
at the level of communities: local struggles did not generate events of 
professional politics, although the work of Indigenous activists at the 
federal level might have shaped mobilizations at the local levels and 
brought some changes to the communities. 
At the same time, this form of advocacy cannot be considered an 
instrument that supported the continuation of Soviet-style treatment 
of Indigenous communities. Today, the function of advocates is 
reduced to that of consultants and experts at best. Evidence suggests 
that professional Indigenous advocacy in Russia was, from the very 
beginning, shaped by the key goals of the international Indigenous 
movement—the affirmation of Indigenous sovereignty. First, the work 
of these politicians signifies something more than amending local and 
regional conditions, given their contribution to the development of laws 
and policies in the federal and international arenas. These politicians 
went beyond the immediate needs of their home communities and 
lobbied for a change of the state treatment of groups with Indigenous 
status. Furthermore, a number of unprecedented developments took 
place at the regional, federal, and international levels, where Indigenous 
advocates, who became professional politicians, participated in 
revolutionizing the area of Indigenous rights as the KMAO example 
demonstrates in particular. This work, supported by collaboration with 
Indigenous rights advocates from other countries, has helped shape a 
new understanding of indigeneity within the Russian context, despite 
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all of its structural limitations. This is supported by the development of 
a new form of consciousness among Indigenous activists, who forged 
a new collective identity as a means to defend their position and to 
define their claims and vision of rights using the international human 
rights tools and system. International support for the Indigenous cause, 
particularly from Scandinavia, Canada, and the United Nations, as well 
as collaboration with scholars and rights advocates, supported the work 
of Indigenous politicians and helped maintain advocacy actions. Thus, 
professional Indigenous politics led to the transformation of the concept 
of “indigeneity” as both a legal idea and a part of the political identity 
of the activists, from an idea signifying a dependency status toward a 
notion of a free people with a right to their self-determined existence.
c) Analysis: Abortive Indigenous Movement
A number of scholars refer to the events of post-Soviet Indigenous 
advocacy as a movement.121 These scholars imply that these 
mobilizations took the form of an organized all-state sustained 
action, which involved a significant number of participants united on 
a volunteer basis by common aims, and which in turn shaped their 
group identity and created a sense of solidarity among the participants. 
While the Indigenous struggles in the post-Soviet Russian state could 
be characterized by the similarities of the aspirations of Indigenous 
leaders, by the instruments they used and the political and legal 
marginalization of Indigenous groups, a careful analysis of specific 
historical circumstances of each struggling community would 
demonstrate that these struggles never developed into an organized 
all-state sustained form of mobilization. On the contrary, a number of 
factors influenced disunity among the struggles’ participants and, as 
some evidence suggests, even created competition among participants 
with opposing interests, given the scarcity of resources they were able 
to obtain. Despite complementing efforts of politicians defending 
Indigenous positions on the international and, to a degree, federal 
121. See Rohr, supra note 25; Stoyanova, supra note 12; T. Köhler and K. 
Wessendorf. Towards a New Millennium: Ten Years of the Indigenous Movement 
in Russia, IWGIA Document 107, (Copenhagen, Denmark: IWGIA, 2002).
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levels in post-Soviet Russia, Indigenous struggles remained non-
sustained local forms of resistance that were destined to fail. 
The primary factors that contributed to the abortive character of 
the Indigenous movement in post-Soviet Russia were structural, 
stemming from the wide geographical distribution of Indigenous 
communities. Wide patterns of living historically prevented 
Indigenous persons from gaining access to power by means of 
election, given that they were (and remain) a demographic minority. 
This factor also contributed to Indigenous underrepresentation in 
the power structures of their regions. During the transition, they had 
to negotiate their interests with the interests of other leaders and/or 
rely on these other leaders in the representation of their interests; this 
therefore contributed to the scarcity of resources these activists could 
use. This factor gains further significance given a correlation between 
the position of the Indigenous territories (as federal subjects) in the 
hierarchical structure of the post-Soviet administrative system and 
the amount of political resources Indigenous activists could use.122 
In most situations, they found themselves either as residents of the 
subjects existing in this status with no connection to the nationality 
of the subject’s residents, or as residents on the territories designated 
as homelands to other nationalities, and this significantly limited their 
political opportunities. Even in the okrugs rich with natural resources, 
as is particularly evident in the case of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug, they were underrepresented in the okrug governing structures. 
Thus, these activists had to join federal and/or regional governments, 
which led to their dependency on the interests of the regional and/
or federal authorities. As the KMAO case particularly suggests, the 
122. This claim rests upon the findings of studies on ethnic mobilizations in post-Soviet 
Russia, whose authors demonstrate that the status of a territory in the hierarchy of the 
Soviet territorial-administrative system determined how much resources activists 
and politicians would have to mobilize during the 1990s. Scholars who study ethnic 
movements during the late 1980s-1990s emphasize a correlation between the status 
of the region within the overall Soviet system of administration and the intensity 
of resistance during the time of transition. The higher the position of a region 
within the federal system, the more intense and focused became the movement to 
secede, in part because the new leaders could access political resources in support 
of their struggles. See D. Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian 
Federation, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
and Roeder, supra note 106.
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success of political campaigns of Indigenous leaders in the subjects 
of the transitioning Russian state depended significantly on the degree 
to which the Indigenous cause corresponded to the interests of the 
new political leaders, and the success of the cooperation between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous politicians. 
The lack of adequate communication and transportation also 
contributed to the difficulties in cohesively organizing. The legal 
illiteracy common among Indigenous communities contributed to the 
abortive character of Indigenous protests: the majority of Indigenous 
persons living in Russia remained unaware of the state and regional 
norms to which they could appeal (and of the international treatment of 
Indigenous Peoples). The poverty that many groups experienced during 
the time of transition and the insufficient means of transportation and 
communication during the late 1980s and early 1990s were additional 
factors that prevented these leaders from effectively organizing.
These factors were reinforced by the socio-historical circumstances 
of Indigenous groups. Indigenous communities, even within the 
boundaries of one peoples, tended to be decentralized; the communities 
confined their affairs, including the ownership of land, to the kinship 
structures, where leadership powers were vested with leaders of 
extended families. These specifics of Indigenous existence contributed 
to the difficulties of political organizing among these groups since 
the moment of the first dissent in the early times of the Soviet Union. 
The members of communities classified as one peoples and/or as 
Indigenous individuals did not perceive themselves as belonging to 
one community (and/or one polity), and thus could not act as one 
during the time of political change (while the instances of Indigenous 
leaders combining resistance forces did take place). 
d)  Conclusion
To conclude, the system of governance of the Russian state recreated 
forms of structural violence against Indigenous persons inherent in the 
Soviet ways of treating these communities, and contributed to both 
the abortive character of Indigenous upheavals at the regional levels 
in the 1990s, and to the downfall of professional Indigenous activism 
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in the 2000s. One of the key features that made Indigenous groups 
vulnerable to the pressures of structural violence in Russia stemmed 
from the wide geographical distribution of their communities. 
This lack of correspondence between the geographical location of 
Indigenous groups and the patterns of territorial administration of 
the state historically prevented Indigenous persons from using the 
state’s administrative apparatus in support of their political interests. 
Further, this factor prevented Indigenous struggles from becoming 
an organized movement and contributed to the internal competition 
among Indigenous activists, which weakened their potential to support 
the rights of their communities. Local Indigenous activists were not 
united by their commonality of interests such as private ownership of 
land and resources that they would be willing to come forth to defend 
(despite that they appealed to the norms of self-government). Neither 
did they have membership in one political organization so as to form 
or even envision a unified statewide effort as a means of gaining access 
to political power. In many ways, they acted similarly to the leaders 
of larger ethnic upheavals whose struggles, likewise, despite diversity 
of their duration, strength and outcomes, were fragmented events. 
At the same time, Indigenous politics remain the main force that led 
to the transformation of indigeneity from a property signifying the 
dependency status of these groups to a notion of free people with a right 
to self-determined existence. Supported by the waves and discourses 
on nationalism within post-Soviet Russia as well as international 
developments in support of Indigenous rights, Indigenous activism in 
Russia signifies a step forward despite the current rights abuses against 
Indigenous communities. 
III. Consequences of Structural Violence
The final discussion examines the effects of structural violence. It 
uses evidence from studies of Indigenous demographics, and provides 
socio-economic indicators to demonstrate how the infringement on 
the political rights of Indigenous communities affects the Indigenous 
lifespan by shaping difficulties of economic survival for these 
communities. 
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Indigenous demographics
a) Data Inconsistencies
Traditionally, demographic characteristics of a group remain the 
basis for assessment of quality of life experiences of the population 
examined, despite controversies surrounding this hypothesis.123 
Growth is interpreted as evidence of life conditions that are favorable 
for the wellbeing of a group; whereas a decline signifies that a group 
experiences difficulties that negatively influence birth rate and the 
mortality of its members. When applied to the analysis of the population 
trends of the Russian Indigenous communities, this approach, however, 
yields paradoxical results. A census-based examination of Indigenous 
demographics suggests a recent slight growth experienced by these 
groups: the number of persons who self-identified as Indigenous 
increased by about 3%: from 252,261 in 2002 to 257,895 in 2010 
(Table 1). The growth also seems to be continuous, at least for the 
original 26 groups: the number of individuals registered as members of 
these 26 communities increased by 13.3% since the last Soviet census 
of 1989: from 184,448 in 1989 to 208,980 in 2002 (Table 1). Given 
that the overall Russian population has been decreasing by 1.5% from 
1989 to 2002, and by 1.7% from 2002 to 2010, these findings suggest 
a seemingly optimistic forecast for Indigenous groups (Table 1). This 
forecast though, contradicts the projections of the population trends 
that would account for the actual conditions Indigenous individuals 
face given their underrepresentation in the political and economic 
structures of the state. Why? 
Further research into the subject matter reveals that factors other 
than increasing birth rates and decreasing mortality have influenced 
the state official statistics on Indigenous populations. One of the key 
factors is the inconsistency of census data: census data contradict 
statistics on Indigenous populations collected by Russian scholars, and 
findings from the studies of Indigenous demographics. Zoia Sokolova 
and Valeriy Stepanov report that Indigenous populations were steadily 
123. F. Andrews, “Population Issues and Social Indicators of Well-being,” Population 
and Environment 6, no. 4 (1983): 210–230.
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declining throughout the 1990s.124 The demographical studies of births 
and deaths also suggest that the number of Indigenous individuals 
has been decreasing since the late 1980s.125 The Russian census is 
not designed to be an instrument of illustrating population trends; it 
merely summarizes citizens’ responses to the census questionnaires. 
Given that Article 26(1) of the Russian Constitution recognizes the 
right of a person to choose his or her nationality, Russian citizens 
are free to decide to which community they believe they belong. The 
reasons why people choose a particular group during the census data 
collection vary, which leads to the census reports being only a partially 
accurate source of data on Indigenous populations and the overall 
ethnic composition of Russia. Nevertheless, the census continues to 
function as the main source of information for federal agencies and, 
often, for scholars. 
The discrepancies of the methods of census data collection, and 
post-Soviet changes in the mechanisms of registration of a person’s 
nationality, remain the leading factors influencing the inaccuracy 
of the census-based projections of Indigenous populations trends. 
Specifically, the census-based population growth among many 
Indigenous groups is influenced by changes in the ways that people 
self-identify.126 Andrew Kozlov, for example, reports that during the 
post-Soviet period, a predominant number of children from inter-ethnic 
124. Z. Sokolova, and V. Stepanov, “Kategoria “Korennie Malochislennie Narodi 
Severa” i Problema Statisticheskogo Ucheta,” [Russian: Категория «коренные 
малочисленные народы Севера» и проблема статистического учета] 
in Etnicheskie Kategorii i Statistika. [Russian: Этнические Категории и 
Статистика] Elena Filippova ed., (2008), 76.
125. D. Bogoyavlenskiy, “Russia's Indigenous Peoples of the North: A Demographic 
Portrait at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century.” Sibirica, 9, no. 3 (2010): 
91–114; and D. Bogoyavlenskiy, “Poslednie Dannie o Chislennosti Narodov 
Severa,” [Russian: Последние Данные о Численности Народов Севера.] 
Demoskop Weekly (2012): 531–532. http://www.csipn.ru/glavnaya/actual/1204-
poslednie-dannye-o-chislennosti-narodov-severa#.VszAzPkrLIU 
126. D. Bogoyavlenskiy, “Vimirayt li Narodi Severa?” [Russian: Вымирают ли 
Народы Севера?] Sociological Studies 8 (2005): 60–1; A. Kozlov, “Izmenenie 
Genofonda Severnikh Populiatsiy: “Zakat Etnosov” ili Formirovanie Novoii 
Adaptivnoii Gruppi?” [Russian: Изменение Генофонда Северных Популяций: 
Закат Этносов или Формирование Новой Адаптивной Группы] Vestnik 
of Archaeology, Anthropology and Ethnography 3, no. 26 (2014): 100; and 
Sokolova and Stepanov, supra note 124, at 77. 
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families of the Saami and the Nenets—from 80% to 90%—chose the 
identity of an Indigenous parent over a non-Indigenous one.127 Given 
how historically different the Saami and the Nenets are, this similarity 
suggests that the trend could be common among other Indigenous 
communities.128 The changes in self-identification might have 
influenced the post-Soviet population increase of the Khant living in 
the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.129 Elena Pivneva, for example, 
reports that in some parts of the okrug, the share of persons who might 
have changed their identity may be as high as 17% to 28%.130 From 
1989 to 2002, the population of the Khant living in the okrug increased 
by 40%: from 22,521 to 28,678. From 2002 to 2010, it increased again 
by 9%, reaching 30,943 in 2010.131 Natural factors cannot account 
for this unusual population growth. Likewise, a relatively steady 
increase in the number of the Dolgan in the Sakha Republic since 
the late 1980s might be due to identity change.132 These processes 
might have affected the demographics of a number of other Indigenous 
communities, scholars suggest, given how visible the decline appears 
among Nganasan, Chuvan, Aleut and Shor between the 1989 and 
2002 censuses; and how significant the growth is (20%–30% increase) 
among the Mansi, the Ket, the Yukagir, the Itelmen, the Selkup, the 
Evenk and the Tofalar during the same period.133 
127. Kozlov, supra note 126, at 100.
128. The Saami demonstrate the highest share among all Indigenous Peoples living 
in Russia of mixed marriages, reaching 90%–95% in 2010. They tend to reside 
primarily in the Murmansk region of the Kola Peninsula, and have a high percentage 
of urban dwellers: more than 40%. The Nenets, on the other hand, are spread out 
across nine different administrative units. Some reside in urban areas (the average 
for urban dwellers across all the Nenets is 21%) while others are nomads involved 
in reindeer herding. The Nenets tend to marry among themselves, with inter-
ethnic marriages fluctuating between 10%–11%, which is again an average for 
all the different Nenets communities. All data are from Federal State Statistical 
Service, “Vseroiskaya Perepis Naselenia. Tom 4. Natsional’niy Sostav,” [Russian: 
Всероссийская Перепись Населения. Том 4. Национальный Состав] (2010), 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm 
129. Bogoyavlenskiy, supra note 126, at 58–9.
130. Pivneva, supra note 55, at 86.
131. See respectively, Sokolova and Stepanov, supra note 124, at 78; and Pivneva, 
supra note 55, at 84. Also consult Table 1 of this work.
132. Bogoyavlenskiy, supra note 126.
133. Sokolova and Stepanov, supra note 124, at 77–78. 
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The changes to the categories defining indigeneity further influenced 
the inaccuracy of the census records of Indigenous demographics. 
These changes are related to the recent “carving” of separate peoples 
(i.e., those with the status of KMN) out of larger nationalities to which 
these peoples used to belong as sub-groups during the Soviet era: by 
the year 2000, the number of communities with Indigenous status was 
expanded from the original 26 groups to the current 40 groups. In some 
cases, a sub-group was created out of a larger group with an Indigenous 
status. For example, the Enets and the Taz, prior to gaining Indigenous 
status in 2000, were registered as sub-groups of the Indigenous Nenets 
and the Udege respectively. Similarly, the Kerek and the Alutor, who 
gained their status in 2000, were until then considered to be sub-groups 
of the Indigenous Koryak. This method of creating new communities 
affected demographics of the original groups that exhibited negative 
changes. While the separation of the Enets from the Nenets did result 
in changes in the Nenets demographics, the number of Udege went 
down as the Taz were registered as a separate group, from 2,001 
in 1989 to 1,657 in 2002; and the number of the Koryak decreased 
from 9,242 in 1989 to 8,743 in 2002. Likewise, the demographics 
of the Indigenous Oroch decreased with the recognition of the Orok, 
historically registered as a sub-group of the Oroch, as an Indigenous 
group in 2000.134 Similar processes affected the demographics of 
the Altai, which decreased more than 10% from 69,400 in 1989 to 
62,100 in 2002 with the recognition of the Altai sub-groups as having 
Indigenous status.135 Given that for the most recently added groups, 
comprehensive statistics are available only for the Shor and the 
Veps, it is difficult to grasp the actual processes within Indigenous 
communities by examining census data alone. 
134. Ibid., 77. Table 1.
135.  See respectively D. Bogoyavlenskiy, Perepis’ 2010: Etnicheskii Srez, [Russian: 
Перепись 2010: Этнический Срез] (2010), http://www.perspektivy.info/history/
perepis_2010_etnicheskij_srez_2013-04-28.htm, and Chemchieva, supra note 
57, at 178. The five Altai communities who gained the status of KMN in 2000, 
were until that moment considered sub-groups of the larger Altai nationality: the 
Tubalar, the Chelkan, and the Kumandin were registered as the northern Altai sub-
groups, while the Telengit and the Teleut were considered the southern Altai sub-
groups (see Part II of this chapter for more). 
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To conclude, the data on Indigenous populations are fraught with 
inconsistencies. In addition, the deterioration of the Soviet statewide 
system of documentation of socio-economic indicators and Indigenous 
demographics further influenced this situation. Today, the regional 
administration is responsible for gathering these statistics, but in 
some regions the administrators are reluctant to collect this data and/
or have stopped doing so.136 This situation is particularly grave for the 
Indigenous persons living in urban areas, since the administrators tend 
to focus only on the areas registered as TTNU while gathering their 
data, and these areas are primarily the rural territories.137 Consequently, 
the analysis of Indigenous demographics must be approached with 
great care, particularly when constructing a comparative study. 
b)  Analysis of the Demographic Processes 
Studies of the demographic processes among separate Indigenous 
groups provide a more reliable picture of the population trends among 
Indigenous communities. In his examination of the natural factors 
influencing Indigenous demographics between 2002 and 2010, Dimitrii 
Bogoyavlenskiy reports a continuous decline. Among the peoples with 
a history of assimilation, the Veps, the Shor, the Saami, the Chuvan 
and the Aleut, the decline is particularly pronounced. Only seven 
peoples—the Nenets, the Dolgans, the Evenk, the Even, the Khant, 
the Mansi and the Yukagir—demonstrate relatively steady positive 
population dynamics, he reports. However, just among the Nenets 
living in Yamal and Taymir and involved in reindeer herding, the 
population growth can be explained by natural factors. Among other 
people, Bogoyavlenskiy concludes, changes in demographics must 
be attributed to factors other than those influencing natural growth.138 
A closer look at the demographics supports Bogoyavlenskiy’s 
projections. 
136. N. Novikova and D. Funk, Sever i Severiane [Russian: Север и Северяне] (2012), 5.
137. Sokolova and Stepanov, supra note 124, at 75.
138. Bogoyavlenskiy, supra note 126. 
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, the individuals of Indigenous origin tend 
to be much younger than the overall population of Russia: 46% of all 
individuals registered as members of Indigenous communities in 2010 
are younger than 25 years old, whereas for all Russia this number is 
29%. The estimated median Indigenous age range is between 21 and 
29, with the average being 28 despite variations within the Indigenous 
populations, while the average age of the population of Russia is 38.139 
The fact that Indigenous communities tend to be younger than the 
overall Russian population is explainable by a relatively high birthrate 
among Indigenous women, which has historically been the case.140 In 
2010, the average number of children per 1,000 Indigenous women 
was 1,914 or 30% higher than that for the overall Russian population, 
which amounted to 1,469 children, as calculated using the data from 
the 2010 census. At the same time, the lifespan of an Indigenous 
person is much shorter than that of an average Russian: only 10% of 
Indigenous individuals are older than 55 years old, whereas for all of 
Russia this number is 25% (Figure 1). 
Mortality rates among the youngest (0–15 years) and oldest (60 
years and older) Indigenous groups tend to be higher than the average 
139. These numbers are calculated using the data from the Federal State Statistical 
Service. See Federal State Statistical Service, supra note 128.
140. D. Bogoyavlenskiy, “Russia's Indigenous Peoples of the North: A Demographic 
Portrait at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Ventury.” Sibirica 9, no. 3 (2010): 
101–103.
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for all Russia.141 Thus, Indigenous persons face a much shorter life span 
than that projected as an average for a Russian citizen. These estima-
tions are consistent with a recent IWGIA study, whose author reports 
that only 37.8% of Indigenous men and 62.2% of Indigenous women 
in Russia reach the age of 60.142 Given that these trends have remained 
consistent since the late 1980s, one could safely project that Indigenous 
populations in the Russian state have been steadily decreasing. 
c) Socio-economic conditions
Among the main factors that contribute to the high mortality rates 
among Indigenous populations are poverty and poor health services. 
The diversity of the economic conditions of the regions of the Russian 
Federation makes it practically impossible to assess the socio-economic 
situations facing Indigenous groups in different parts of the state within 
the scope of one essay. Thus, a few characteristic estimations are proposed 
instead to illustrate the situation. Poverty is a common problem for most 
Indigenous communities, yet it tends to be particularly prominent for 
rural inhabitants who constitute about two thirds of the total Indigenous 
population.143 The rural Indigenous residents must be engaged in the 
economic practices that would resemble their traditional means of 
subsistence: agriculture, hunting, and forestry, as these practices appear 
in the census. These occupations are among the lowest paid, generating 
about three times less money than an average income in Russia. Given 
that an average income for 2010 was also rather modest—10,668 rubles 
or about $365—a rural Indigenous worker would remain at the bottom 
of the economic ladder. Yet extreme poverty results from a lack of jobs, 
which in turn directly contributes to the short lifespan among Indigenous 
groups.144 Unemployment remains a key problem across all Indigenous 
communities, where among some groups (for example, the Veps) the level 
141. Rohr, supra note 25, at 33.
142. Ibid., 32.
143. These calculations are based on the data from the 2010 Russian census data, 
with the following estimations: 174,338 of Indigenous persons are rural dwellers 
while 87,134 live in urban areas, or 67% and 33% respectively. See Federal State 
Statistical Service, supra note 128.
144. Kozlov and Lisitsyn, supra note 53, at 88–89.
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of unemployment reaches over 50% of the entire working population, or 
among those 15–72 years old.145 One of the key factors contributing to 
unemployment is the history of limited education opportunities for many 
communities, especially those located in rural areas.146 
The other main sources of income, apart from subsistence farming, 
are pensions and federal subsidies. The amount of a pension differs 
from one region to another in correspondence with the overall federal 
estimation of living expenses in the Russian regions. In 2016, in 
Karelia, for example, the monthly pension was 14,670 rubles (or about 
$195); in Komi it was 9,250 rubles (or about $123); in Chukotka it was 
23,100 rubles (or about $308), with an average amount of pension in 
Russia being 12,400 rubles per month (or about $165).147 Living in 
the North, though, is characterized by a higher cost of living, which 
contributes to historically pronounced poverty among the majority of 
Indigenous communities. For example, in 2016, the average prices 
of food in the North were much higher when compared with the 
pensions: a loaf of bread may cost between 30 cents and a dollar; a 
liter of milk is about 80 cents; meat prices may be between $2.50 and 
$5 per kilogram, and fish could be about $7 per kilogram.148 Fruits 
and vegetables are costly, as well as cheeses and grains, particularly if 
they are imported. Prices of alcohol and tea, highly consumed among 
Northerners, are also relatively high. In addition to the cost of food, 
one must pay for communal services, which are rising in cost, and at 
times must also pay for rent and health services. Thus, the majority of 
Indigenous persons in the North face extreme poverty. 
Poor health services, especially in remote areas, further influence 
high mortality rates among Indigenous communities since this fac-
tor contributes to high rates of illnesses. Johannes Rohr, in his 2014 
report for example, estimates the percentages of death from infectious 
diseases among Indigenous communities is three times the national 
145. Federal State Statistical Service, supra note 128.
146. Stoyanova, supra note 12, at 171.
147. These numbers are calculated in accordance with the data obtained from Pensionniy 
Ekspert, a Russian independent information project on the pension system. The 
rate of conversion used was the one valid as of May 2016. 
148. Tsenomer, Tseni na Produkti v Rossii, [Russian: Цены на Продукты в России] 
(2016), http://tsenomer.ru/russia/
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average, causing 60 deaths per 100,000 individuals.149 Heart dis-
eases, hypertension and cancer are also common across Indigenous 
groups.150 Death from unnatural causes, including suicide, is also an 
acute problem, particularly among men. While in Russia, on average, 
about 15% of all deaths are from unnatural causes (injuries, suicide, 
homicide), among Indigenous persons this number tends to be higher. 
For example, in 2013, the rates of suicide in Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, and the Archangelsk Rayon 
were 1.5–2.5 times higher than the Russian average.151 Andrew 
Kozlov and Dmitry Lisitsyn report that in 2008 in some regions it 
was three or even four times the national average; Komi Republic and 
Koryak Autonomous Okrug, according to these researchers, were the 
areas with the highest rates of reported suicide for that year.152 Russian 
scholars estimate that overall, Indigenous individuals inhabit regions 
with a relatively unhealthy suicidal climate despite the decrease in 
the numbers of suicide in Russia. A number of suicides occur while 
people are intoxicated; Kozlov and Lisitsyn estimate the number to 
fluctuate from 24% to 55%. They suggest that in many Northern com-
munities, alcoholism is a serious problem, and is particularly grave 
for the Chukchi.153 Today Chukotka is the leading Russian region by 
rate of alcoholism, with 7.3% of the total population affected by the 
disease.154 Given that death from unnatural causes tends to affect more 
men than women, there is a pronounced gender imbalance, particu-
larly in the populations over 30. According to the 2010 census, among 
all Indigenous communities but the Aleut, the number of women 
149. Rohr, supra note 25, at 33.
150. UNDESA, “State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, Volume II,” (2015), 169.
151. E. Lubov, Y. Sumarokov, and E. Konoplenko, “Jhiznestoi’kost’ i Faktori Riska 
Suitsidalnogo Povedenia Korennikh Malochislennikh Narodov Severa Rossii,” 
[Russian Жизнестойкость и Факторы Риска Суицидального Поведения 
Коренных Малочисленных Народов Севера России] Suitsidologia 6, no.3 
(2015): 25. 
152. Kozlov and Lisitsyn, supra note 53, at 96.
153. Ibid., 96–89.
154. V. Chashchin, et al., “Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskie i Povedencheskie Faktori Riska 
Narushenii Zdorovia Sredi Korennogo Naselenia Kra’ynego Severa,” [Russian: 
Социально-Экономические и Поведенческие Факторы Риска Нарушений 
Здоровья Среди Коренного Населения Крайнего Севера.”] Human Ecology 6 
(2016): 5. 
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exceeded that of men. This situation seems to be the worst among the 
Even and the Saami: for every 1,000 Even men there were 1,416 Even 
women in 2010, while for every 1,000 Saami men there were 1,300 
Saami women.155 
Some regional governments responded to the difficulties 
experienced by Indigenous communities, and provided subsidies to 
these communities in addition to the state-sponsored benefits. For 
example, the government of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 
subsidizes traditional forms of subsistence; supports cultural and 
educational developments of Indigenous communities; and provides 
help with housing and social services.156 The level of grants and 
subsidies is not significant, given that KMAO is the largest region of 
oil development in Russia: for example, an Indigenous family receives 
2,000 rubles when their child is born, or about $267.157 At the same 
time, this support is due in part to the history of Indigenous politics in 
this region. In the Sakha Republic, the government helps Indigenous 
families by subsidizing reindeer herding, hunting, and fishing. The 
nomad families receive grants to support a reindeer herding lifestyle, 
to buy equipment and movable housing. These families also pay less 
tax. High school graduates also receive paid training if they join a 
reindeer herding team. Similarly, the government of the Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, home to 60% of the country’s nomadic population, 
provides support to Indigenous communities (primarily the Nenets) to 
maintain their nomadic lifestyles and traditional subsistence practices. 
Young men can choose to switch their military service to do alternative 
work in the territories registered as TTNU.158 The degree to which 
regional benefits, particularly in the form of grants, support economic 
survival of Indigenous communities in the long run, demands further 
155. Federal State Statistical Service, supra note 128.
156. KMNS, Gosudarstvennaya Podderjka. Perechen’ Mer, [Russian: 
Государственная Поддержка. Перечень Мер.] (2017), http://www.kmns.
admhmao.ru/gosudarstvennaya-podderzhka/
157. Neftugansk, Meri Sotsial’noy Podderjki, [Russian: Меры Социальной 
Поддержки] (2017), http://www.admugansk.ru/read/2102 
158. E. Martinova, “Yamalo-Nenets Avtonomnii Okrug,” [Russian: Ямало-Ненецкий 
Автономный Округ] in Sever i Severiane [Russian: Север и Северяне], Natalia 
Novikova and Dmitriy Funk eds., (2012): 65; and Tishkov, Novikova, and Pivneva, 
supra note 33, at 279.
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investigation. Some scholars suggest that promotion of the traditional 
forms of subsistence works when the authorities financially support 
it. For example, these measures encouraged reindeer herding in the 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and were supported by regional 
grants. One can observe a nine times increase of ventures supporting 
traditional forms of subsistence in the same okrug, from 42 in 2011 
to 378 in 2014.159 In the Sakha Republic, likewise, the number of 
obshchina has been increasing since 2009; these ventures, thus, also 
seem to support agricultural practices of Indigenous communities in 
the republic.160 In Altai Republic, on the other hand, the traditional 
forms of subsistence seem to be secondary to the economic survival 
of Indigenous groups and might be substituted by contemporary 
economic practices in the near future.161 While in Altai Republic, 40 
obshchinas were registered in 2012, no conclusive evidence suggests 
that these ventures help improve the economic situations of those 
using them. At times, the land registered as a TTNU is employed for 
other means by local administration and businesses.162
Finally, Indigenous women and men often face social discrimination. 
One of the most commonly reported forms of discrimination is that 
of the local and regional administrative officials, who deny benefits 
to Indigenous individuals and/or are reluctant to help Indigenous 
persons to realize their rights. This problem is complicated in part by 
the requirement for an Indigenous person to present an identity proof 
of their Indigenous nationality prior to being considered for benefits. 
In addition, when applying for support for a family, the applicants 
must establish their social status as living under the poverty line. This 
requirement creates difficulties for many Indigenous individuals who 
are unaware of how to apply for the benefits or complete the registration 
process, and/or do not have any official documents to establish their 
nationality. In contrast with Soviet documentation practices, where a 
159. As reported by Pivneva, supra note 55, at 88; and by the Government of Khanty-
Mansi Okrug, supra note 87, correspondingly.
160. E. Romanova, A. Evodokia, and V. Ignatieva, “Respublika Sakha (Yakutia),” 
[“Russian: “Республика Саха (Якутия)”] in Sever i Severiane [Russian Север и 
Северяне], Natalia Novikova, and Dmitriy Funk, eds. (2012): 104. 
161. Chemchieva, supra note 57, at 135.
162. Ibid., 100, 115–120.
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citizen’s nationality was recorded in their passport, the contemporary 
documentation system does not stipulate information on nationality to 
be recorded on state-issued ID. While the governments of the Sakha 
Republic, Buryatia and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug created 
regional instruments that help to record information on a person’s 
nationality, in many other parts of Russia this problem is not solved. 
Thus, some individuals cannot realize their rights, and must appeal to 
court to establish their belonging to an Indigenous community.163 
To conclude, structural inequality facing most Indigenous people 
remains the central factor of the premature deaths of many Indigenous 
men and women living in contemporary Russia. The very fact that most 
Indigenous persons never achieve their full potential as citizens of the 
Russian state—meaning, as members of the political and economic 
systems which have never been of their own choosing—signifies that 
most of them survive life situations characterized by violence for 
which it is often difficult to identify a perpetrator. Social agents con-
tribute to perpetuating the unfair treatment of Indigenous individuals 
by being reluctant to respond to the difficulties many Indigenous men 
and women face, and/or having little understanding of the connec-
tions between Indigenous lifestyles and the wellbeing of Indigenous 
communities. The fact that Indigenous cultural practices and forms 
of subsistence are supported only by some regional governments and 
are often supported unevenly, suggests that many officials find assim-
ilation to be a necessary accommodation that Indigenous individuals 
must make to survive. This attitude is particularly visible in the fed-
eral approach to the issues of Indigenous rights. The federal measures 
devised to support Indigenous communities resemble more a set of 
paternalistic strategies to maintain vulnerable populations of the state 
rather than a means of reforming relations among culturally diverse 
collectives (i.e., nationalities) of the economically unstable and poten-
tially volatile state. Such an attitude helps to justify persistence of 
poverty among Indigenous groups; invisibility of Indigenous leaders 
in positions of power; lack of adequate education and job opportunities 
for Indigenous youth; and other evidence of connections between the 
functioning of state institutions and the social and cultural destruction 
163. Yakel, supra note 12, at 16.
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of Indigenous communities. At the same time, supporting the assimila-
tion of Indigenous communities happens at the cost of the security and 
stability of all Russian citizens, given that accommodation of needs 
of cultural minorities remains a precondition for maintenance of the 
internal security of Russia as well as of a legitimate international order. 
IV. Concluding Thoughts
Democracy is an “incomplete struggle” using the rule of law, legis-
lative power and the state as the engine for social welfare.164 One of the 
main premises of this work is that the functioning of democratic forms 
of government is rooted in social consciousness, allowing different 
groups to realize their aims through social and political practices. 
Democratic forms of governance—which may enable Indigenous peo-
ples to exercise their rights as part of a state system—embody on-going 
social struggles by which Indigenous women and men are able to par-
ticipation in state politics. The actual actors of political change might, 
at times, conduct these struggles without the full realization of their 
meaning and impact. At the same time, these struggles are nascent 
forms of Indigenous governance in development, shaping the political 
consciousness of the groups involved and effecting political change.
This study demonstrates that the contemporary Russian state system 
remains highly conducive to structural violence against Indigenous 
communities, who remain at the margins of the system. Most Indigenous 
persons face harsh life conditions and are discriminated against by 
authorities who deny or limit their rights. These consequences are not 
unique to the Indigenous communities in the present Russian state; 
oftentimes their non-Indigenous neighbors survive poverty and harsh 
living conditions on a similar scale without being beneficiaries of any 
special policies. These similarities suggest that within the settings 
of everyday living, indigeneity (or ethnicity) per se does not play a 
significant role in the degree to which processes of structural violence 
affect a person. At the same time, indigeneity—unlike nationality—
contains a potential political inherent in the legal notion of “Indigenous 
164. B. Moore, Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship, (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Beacon Press,1966), 414.
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Peoples”; this notion developed at international forums, and it is a 
tool that Russian Indigenous politicians may deploy to continue their 
struggle toward self-determined existence.
This study reveals that Indigenous politicians lack the direct means 
with which to withstand the unfair treatment of federal and often 
regional governments; yet they may collaborate and use an existing 
framework to improve conditions and widen political opportunities 
for Indigenous communities. The experiences of KMAO, in particular, 
suggest that the joint federal and regional legal powers over Indigenous 
issues allow regional authorities to exercise a degree of autonomy 
from the central government in areas rich with natural resources. 
The collaboration between Indigenous and regional leaders—when 
common interests unite them—may provide a tool of resistance to 
the centralization measures instituted by federal government, and 
thus lessen the current effects of structural violence on Indigenous 
Peoples. Further research in this area is needed. It may illuminate the 
actual practices of Indigenous resistance to federal oppression and, 
by so doing, improve the scholarly understanding of the historical 
influences of regional politics on the contemporary workings of the 
federal political and legal systems.
TABLE 1: Population Count of the Small-Numbered Peoples of the North/
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East 1926–2010
Years of 
the census 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2010
The Common List of Small-Numbered Peoples of the North
Nenets 17,566 24,053 23,007 28,705 29,894 34,665 
(34,190)
41,302 44,640
Evenk 38,746 29,666 24,151 25,149 27,531 30,163 
(29,901)
35,527 38,396
Khanty 22,306 19,160 19,410 21,138 20,934 22,521 
(22,283)
28,678 30,943
Even 2,044 9,698 9,121 12,029 12,286 17,199 
(17,055)
19,071 21,830
Chuckhi 12,332 13,835 11,727 13,597 14,000 15,184 
(15,107)
15,767 15,908
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Nanai 5,860 8,526 8,026 10,005 10,516 12,023 
(11,883)
12,160 12,003
Mansi 5,754 6,315 6,449 7,710 7,563 8,474 
(8,266)
11,432 12,269
Koryak 7,439 7,354 6,287 7,487 7,879 9,242 
(8,942)
8,743 7,953
Dolgan 650 3,971 3,932 4,877 5,053 6,945 
(6,571)
7,261 7,885
Nivkh 4,076 3,902 3,717 4,420 4,397 4,673 
(4,631)
5,162 4,652
Selkup 1,630 6,441 3,768 4,282 3,565 3,612 
(3,564)
4,249 3,649
Itelmen 4,217 1,706 1,109 1,301 1,370 2,481 
(2,429)
3,180 3,193
Ul’cha 723 n/d 2,055 2,448 2,552 3,233 
(3,173)
2,913 2,765
Saami 1,720 1,836 1,792 1,884 1,888 1,890 
(1,835)
1,991 1,771
Eskimo 1,293 1,309 1,118 1,308 1,510 1,719 
(1,704)
1,750 1,738
Udege 1,357 1,743 1,444 1,469 1,551 2,011 
(1,902)
1,657 1,496
Ket 1,428 1,243 1,019 1,182 1,122 1,113 
(1,084)
1,494 1,219
Yukagir 443 507 442 615 835 1,142 
(1,112)
1,509 1,603
Chuvan 705 611 (534) 1 1 1,511 
(1,384)
1,087 1,002
Tofalar 415 410 586 620 763 731 
(722)
837 762
Nganasan 887 738 748 953 867 1,278 
(1,262)
834 862
Oroch 647 n/d 782 1,089 1,198 915 
(883)
686 596
Negidal 683 n/d (350) 537 504 622 
(587)
567 513
Aleut 353 335 421 441 546 702 
(644)
540 482
Orok 162 n/d (300) n/d (317) 190 
(179)
346 295


























































The Groups Added to the Common List after 1993
1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 2002 2010
Shor 12,600 (16,044) 15,300 16,500 16,033 15,745 13,975 12,888
Veps 32,785 29 700 16,374 
(15,300)
8,281 8,094 12,142 8,240 5,936










Teleut (1,000) n/d n/d n/d n/d 2,594 2,650 2,643





n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 2,293 1,927
Tubalar n/d n/d n/d (7000) n/d n/d 1,596 
(1,565)
1,965
Chelkan (1,000) 0* (cal-
culated 
as Altai)
n/d n/d n/d (700-800) 855 1,181
















TOTAL (40 peoples) 252,261 257,895
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Abazin 13,825 n/d 19,591 25,448 29,000 n/d 37,942 43,341
Besserm-
ian
n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d/ n/d 3,122 2,201
Seto n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d 197 197 214
Izjorts 16,137 n/d 1,062 781 748 449 327 266
Vod’ 705 (500) 50 n/d (66) 62 73 64





The table is compiled using data from: Stoyanova, supra note 12; Demoskop 
Weekly, Perepisi Naselenia Rossiyskoy Imperii, SSSR, 15 Novih Nezavisimih 
Gosudarstv, [Russian: Переписи Населения Российской Империи, СССР, 15 
Новых Независимых Государств] (2014), http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/census.
php?cy=6; Federal State Statistical Service, “Vseroiskaya Perepis Naselenia.Itogi,” 
[Russian: Всероссийская Перепись Населения. Итоги] (2010), http://www.
gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm; T. Golikova, 
“Sovremennoe Sostoyanie Natsionalnih Yazikov v Respublike Altai,” [Russian: 
Современное состояние национальных языков в Республике Алтай]. The materials 
of the II International Conference, 28–29 November 2013, Kazan, http://linguistics-
online.narod.ru/index/golikova_t_a_sovremennoe_sostojanie_nacionalnykh_
jazykov_v_respublike_altaj/0-794; N. Antufieva, “Korennie Malochislennie Narodi 
Rossii: Kolichestvo Tuvintsev-Todjintsev Ymenshilos’ Znachitelnee Vsekh,” 
[Russian: Коренные Малочисленные Народы России: Количество Тувинцев-
Тоджинцев Уменьшилось Значительнее Всех] Center for Asia 9 (2013), http://
www.centerasia.ru/issue/2013/9/4532-korennie-malochislennie-narodi-rossii.
html; A. Bashkarev, “Natsionalnie Administrativnie dinitsi na Territoriakh 
Kompaktnogo Projivania Vepsov v 1920–30kh Godakh,” [Russian: Национальные 
Aдминистративные Единицы на Территориях Компактного Проживания 
Вепсов в 1920–30-х Годах] Scientific-Technical Bulletin of SPbSPU 4, no. 136 
(2011): 173–177; VK. Ofitsialnaya Yralskaya Statistika. [Russian: Официальная 
Уральская Статистика] (2010), https://vk.com/topic-15161897_22790669; and 
Assotsiatsia Korennih Malochislennih Narodov Severa, Dannie Vserossiyskoy 
Perepisis 2010. [Russian: Данные Всероссийской Переписи 2010] (2012), http://
www.raipon.info/peoples/data-census-2010/data-census-2010.php#/
The numbers in brackets are estimations created using data from the sources 
consulted. Those in 2010 marked with an asterisk are calculated as part of 
larger peoples.
